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Toxic TORT LITIGATION AND THE
CAUSATION ELEMENT: Is THERE ANY
HOPE OF RECONCILIATION?
by
Ora Fred Harris, Jr. *
[T]his new kind of harm fails to fit into the mold of a traditional com-
mon law tort. Rules and causes of action that developed from tradi-
tional, individualized wrongs do not allow recovery by toxic waste
victims.I
HE above view quite adequately places in proper perspective the di-
lemma that has surfaced today in trying to reconcile the hitherto little
understood toxic or hazardous waste exposure injury2 with the prin-
ciples and goals underlying traditional common law tort liability. The singu-
lar nature of a toxic tort injury with its inherent problems of latency and
causal indeterminacy 3 wreaks havoc with establishing the fault of a specific
individual or corporate entity and presents well-nigh insuperable problems
in demonstrating the requisite causal relationship between exposure to a haz-
ardous waste or toxic substance and a victim's subsequent injury.4 In view
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1. Note, The Inapplicability of Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The
Example of Toxic Waste Pollution Victim Compensation, 35 STAN. L. REV. 575, 580 (1983).
2. A vast amount of scientific uncertainty envelops the question of the manifestation of
injuries resulting from exposure to hazardous waste or toxic substances. See, e.g., Note, Tort
Actions for Cancer: Deterrence, Compensation, and Environmental Carcinogenesis, 90 YALE
L.J. 840, 840 (1981) (in the case of cancer, a dreaded, widely researched disease, the actual
etiology is scientifically uncertain).
3. See Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to Injury
Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REV. 259, 262 (1960).
When the onset of the disease or injury is latent (delayed), predictions of future
incidence are based on statistical possibilities. When, in addition, the biological
causal relationship also is non-specific (it may be caused by radiation but also
arises among unexposed groups and no differentiation between those cases
caused by radiation and those caused otherwise is possible), the legal problems,
difficult before, become unmanageable under existing rules.
Id.; see also Elliott, Goal Analysis Versus Institutional Analysis of Toxic Compensation Systems,
73 GEo. L.J. 1357, 1372 (1985) (problem is not only scientific uncertainty but also sheer
number of small contributors to total risk so that matching particular exposures to particular
diseases is impractical).
4. Zazzali & Grad, Hazardous Wastes: New Rights and Remedies?, 13 SETON HALL L.
REV. 446, 457 (1983) (proof of causation is a major recurring issue). Yet, in view of the
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of this untenable situation, questions regarding the prudence of reforming
the traditional tort liability system to make it responsive to the peculiar de-
mands of this "new" toxic tort have arisen. These modifications have been
examined from a policy,' an economic, 6 and even an insurance point of
view.
7
This Article focuses primarily upon the possible ramifications that any
tinkering with the current tort system may have on the venerable policy
objectives of tort law: compensation, deterrence, and corrective justice.8 In
this connection, this Article basically presents an analysis of some possible
adjustments to the causation element, the satisfaction of which is normally a
condition precedent for recovery under any of the commonly recognized tort
theories such as negligence, nuisance, trespass, strict liability, or strict prod-
ucts liability.9 The inquiry is aimed at formulating a thesis of causation that
will augment the toxic waste exposure victim's chances of compensation and
will, at the same time, foster the fulfillment of the other two traditional
objectives of tort law, deterrence and corrective justice. 10 Through this pro-
cess the Article attempts to develop a causation theory that is consistent
with the dynamics of modem toxic tort litigation.II Moreover, the Article
offers and explores a proposal regarding the proper forum and scheme for
interposing this causation model into toxic tort cases.
proliferation in toxic tort complaints within the last few years, "this may be the area of a
litigation explosion in the near future." Knepper, Review of Recent Tort Trends, 34 DEF. L.J.
1, 2 (1985); see Moore, Barrage of Private Tort Claims Simmer Beneath Toxic Dumps, Legal
Times, Oct. 22, 1984, at 1, col. 3.
5. From a policy perspective, the paramount concern underlying the impetus for reform
in the field of toxic torts is to increase the chances that the innocent exposure victim will
recover. Secondary, but important, considerations are deterrence, or risk reduction, and cor-
rective justice among the parties. Thus, tort reform in this area is wedded to traditional tort
objectives. But see Note, supra note 1, at 575 (most tort reform proposals meet only one of
these tort objectives, compensation).
6. See Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vi-
sion of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1984).
7. See Schmalz, Superfunds and Tort Law Reforms-Are They Insurable?, 38 Bus. LAW.
175, 175 (1982) (federal statute is only viable method of achieving kind and scope of tort law
reforms likely to remain insurable in private markets); Note, Insurance and Its Role in the
Struggle Between Protecting Pollution Victims and the Producers of Pollution, 31 DRAKE L.
REV. 913, 926 (1981) (inability to compensate pollution victims, either under insurance poli-
cies or tort law, lies within present tort law system).
8. Note, supra note 1, at 575.
9. See Note, An Analysis of Common Law and Statutory Remedies for Hazardous Waste
Injuries, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 117, 124 (1980) (each theory of recovery has difficulty of proving
that defendant's conduct was cause of plaintiff's injuries). For juries, causation is the only
liability issue. Weinstein, The Role of the Court in Toxic Tort Litigation, 73 GEO. L.J. 1389,
1389 (1985).
10. Any changes should not be made in a vacuum but with the potential effects, if any,
upon traditional tort objectives in mind. Before any of these new theories of victim compensa-
tion deserve labeling as a recovery in tort, their capacity to attain venerable tort goals should
be closely assessed. But see Mashaw, A Comment on Causation, Law Reform, and Guerrilla
Warfare, 73 GEO. L.J. 1393, 1394-95 (1985) (author castigates traditional tort process because
it provides neither deterrence nor adequate compensation).
11. Unlike many commentaries on this subject, this Article attempts to explore in greater
detail the synergistic relationship of law and science in unmasking and resolving the problems
attendant to proving causation in toxic tort litigation.
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THEORIES OF RECOVERY FOR TOXIC
OR HAZARDOUS EXPOSURE INJURIES: THE CAUSATION
PROBLEM
Within the pale of traditional tort liability analysis four theories readily
come to mind when considering the possible avenues available for toxic or
hazardous waste exposure victims to recover damages for their injuries.
These actions may be grounded upon nuisance, trespass, negligence, strict
liability or strict products liability. 12 Each theory is fraught with difficulty
in the toxic tort context for a number of reasons; 13 most notably, the causa-
tion component of each theory of action is a common conundrum.
Regardless of the theory of recovery employed, the exposure victim has to
establish, with varying degrees of difficulty, that the defendant's conduct was
a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury. 14 The plaintiff must demonstrate
cause-in-fact on a more probable than not basis, that is, the plaintiff must
show a probability of causation in excess of fifty percent. 15 Furthermore, the
cause-in-fact must comport with either the "but for" test or the "substantial
factor" test. 16 The plaintiff must prove by the preponderance of the evidence
that "but for" the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff would not have been
injured or, alternatively, that the defendant's conduct was a substantial fac-
tor in bringing about the plaintiff's injury. 17 The common law thus requires
that the plaintiff establish causation with reasonable certainty and specificity;
should the plaintiff fail to do so by the greater probability, he or she will
recover no recompense for any injuries. 18
12. Another theory conceivably implicated in these circumstances is tortious misrepresen-
tation. See Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 192 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (fraud
claim in connection with exposure to asbestos).
13. For an illuminating discussion of the proof problems attendant to trespass, nuisance,
negligence, and strict liability see Note, supra note 9, at 122-38. Because strict liability dis-
penses with the requirement of proving fault, it is championed by some commentators as a
progressive approach to adopt in toxic tort liability cases. See id. at 129-31.
14. The causation-in-fact element scrutinized in this Article should not be confused with
the concept of proximate cause, which has nothing to do with causal relationship, but is simply
a policy-based concept used to keep the scope of tort liability within reasonable bounds. Cau-
sation-in-fact (hereinafter interchangeably used with the word "causation") concerns, for the
most part, the factual relationship between cause and effect. See Malone, Ruminations on
Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 60 (1956). Another commentator has added a third dis-
tinct component to the causation formula: causal link. Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the
Law of Torts. An Essay to Henry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CH1. L. REV. 69, 71 (1975).
15. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 858.
16. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 267-68
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER] (author applauds comparative superiority of
"substantial factor" test).
17. Quite frankly, in most factual circumstances, both tests are likely to produce the same
results. Any act that was a "but for" cause was probably also a "substantial factor" in bring-
ing about a particular result. See id. A notable exception may be those situations involving
concurrent causes, either of which alone could have produced the result. The "but for" test is
probably inappropriate in such situations. Id. § 41, at 239; see Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P.
& S. Ste. M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920) (two merging fires, one of unknown
origin; only the substantial factor test was appropriate).
18. Those critics of the traditional common law rules concerning causation understanda-
bly have questioned whether the rules promote the venerable tort goals of compensation (the
plaintiff may receive absolutely nothing for his or her injuries because of the all-or-nothing
1986]
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Causation problems are greatly compounded when applied to the field of
toxic or hazardous exposure injury. A common, generally accurate, evalua-
tion of humankind's understanding of the behavior of hazardous or toxic
wastes and the effect of exposure on humans points to a vast amount of
scientific uncertainty.' 9 This uncertainty is understandable given that many
of these issues are at the very frontiers of science.20 Thus, a plaintiff at-
tempting to establish that exposure to a particular substance has in fact
caused his or her injury may face a dubious court or jury because of the lack
of scientific certainty. 21 Moreover, because this "new" tort injury can have a
latency period 22 of up to as many as twenty to thirty years, it may be, as a
practical matter, virtually impossible to establish the requisite causal rela-
tionship between an exposure that may have taken place many decades ago
and a recently manifested injury now claimed to be the consequence of that
exposure. 23 Not only does this long latency period stymie the toxic or haz-
ardous exposure victim's ability to isolate the alleged substance that precipi-
tated the injury, it also diminishes the chances of identifying the responsible
parties. 24 These two requirements are critical if an injured plaintiff is to es-
tablish causation successfully in a toxic tort case. Because of this latency
phenomenon and the causal indeterminacy that it spawns, traditional tort
liability principles, which generally impose upon the plaintiff the burden of
proving causation-in-fact by a preponderance of the evidence, simply serve
as an impregnable barrier to recovery by an exposure victim. Stated more
bluntly, traditional tort rules and analyses concerning causation are perhaps
out of place when applied to toxic tort litigation.25
preponderance approach), deterrence (the defendant may be able to externalize all the costs of
his tortious acts), and corrective justice (discerning any justice between the parties is difficult
when a tortfeasor is allowed to shift the entire loss stemming from his or her conduct to the
shoulders of the innocent injured party). See Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 855-59.
19. See, e.g., Trauberman, Statutory Reform of "Toxic Torts": Relieving Legal Scientific,
and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. L. REV. 177, 197-200 (1983); Note,
The Burden of Proof in Environmental and Public Health Litigation, 49 UMKC L. REV. 207,
208 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Burden of ProoA; Note, Toxic Substance Contami-
nation: The Risk-Benefit Approach to Causation Analysis, 14 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 53, 53 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Toxic Substance Contamination].
20. See United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870, 881 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (a
dioxin case).
21. See Johnson v. Tipton, 103 Ill. App. 3d 291, 431 N.E.2d 464 (1982).
22. Latency period means the interval between the time one is exposed to a toxic sub-
stance or hazardous waste and the time that an injury or disease manifests itself.
23. See, e.g., McElveen & Eddy, Cancer and Toxic Substances: The Problem of Causation
and the Use of Epidemiology, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29, 39-43 (1984); Rosenberg, supra note 6,
at 855-59; Note, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation: A Proposal for Tort Reform, 10
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 797, 827-31 (1982).
24. The responsible party, for example, may be unidentifiable because of the number of
generators that may have used a particular waste site, all disposing of similar, if not identical,
toxic or hazardous wastes. Moreover, the ownership and operation of these waste sites gener-
ally changes quite rapidly, making assignment of blame to any specific individual, group of
individuals, or legal entity extremely difficult. See Note, Proving Causation in Toxic Torts
Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1299, 1301 (1983). "The burden of identifying the responsi-
ble party can be an impossible one to meet." Id.
25. See Note, supra note 1, at 580.
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II. THE RISK OF EXPOSURE TO Toxic SUBSTANCES
OR HAZARDOUS WASTES
A. The Nature and Extent of the Risk
As the United States continues to develop economically, striking a proper
balance between economic output and the quality of the environment be-
comes more profoundly significant.2 6 Most, if not all, Americans want a
better standard of living; yet, this desire may require a trade-off in regard to
maintaining a healthy environment. 27 For example, a socially beneficial
manufacturing or chemical process, which produces highly useful products
and provides employment for a substantial number of people, may generate
as a by-product a vast amount of toxic substances or hazardous wastes,28
which may pose a significant threat to human health and the environment.
Moreover, these toxic substances or hazardous wastes may be disposed of
improperly, 29 thus exacerbating the risk of harm.30 To assist in compre-
hending the magnitude of the danger involved, note that "[e]xperts estimate
that of the approximately 50,000 hazardous waste disposal sites in the coun-
try, between 1300 and 34,000 sites contain substantial amounts of hazardous
wastes which could damage human health or the environment. '3 1
With a human exposure risk problem of such mammoth proportions, the
improper disposal of toxic and hazardous wastes is a national public health
problem. 32 This unpalatable situation costs the nation not only in environ-
mental terms, but tends to drain our economic resources as well. A prime
example of the massive economic investment that has been made in manag-
ing and controlling hazardous waste sites is the Superfund program.33 In
this program Congress originally committed $1.6 billion for the emergency
cleanup of hazardous waste sites whose actual or threatened releases create
26. The balancing of these countervailing considerations is always a major underpinning
of environmental regulation and decision-making. See T. SCHOENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY LAW 59-60 (1985).
27. Id. at 60 ("people argue that environmental disruption must be tolerated as a 'trade-
off' to progress"). The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(2)
(1982) states that:
[T]he economic and population growth of our Nation, and the improvements in
the standard of living enjoyed by our population, have required increased indus-
trial production to met our needs, and have made necessary the demolition of
old buildings, the construction of new buildings, and the provision of highways
and other avenues of transportation, which, together with related industrial,
commercial, and agricultural operations, have resulted in a rising tide of scrap,
discarded, and waste materials.
28. One commentator noted that "[e]very year millions of tons of hazardous wastes are
discarded into the environment." Note, supra note 23, at 797.
29. Id. at 798.
30. "Perhaps 90 percent of these hazardous wastes, or 41 million tons, is being disposed of
improperly." Goldfarb, The Hazards of Our Hazardous Waste Policy, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J.
249, 251 (1979).
31. Note, supra note 23, at 798.
32. For example, the etiology of "from 70 to 90 percent of all cancers" is said to be
environmental factors. Id.
33. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as Superfund or CERCLA]. For a discus-
sion of clean-up costs see Annot., 70 A.L.R. FED. 329 (1984).
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an imminent and substantial danger to human health and the environment. 34
In addition, staggering amounts of money have been expended in connection
with administering and enforcing the various federal environmental
statutes.
3 5
To date, this massive environmental threat and the concomitant economic
commitment to counteract it show no sign of waning.36 The most practical
goal may be simply to stabilize the danger at its present level through the
stringent enforcement of federal, and perhaps state,37 environmental laws.
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9631-9633 (1982). Taxes on petroleum and certain chemicals initially
comprised 85% of the fund, while penalties, certain amounts collected under the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, and Treasury appropriations comprise the remaining amount.
Id. § 9631. $1.6 billion seemed grossly inadequate to deal effectively with the colossal problem
of cleaning up hazardous waste sites. Recent proposals concerning reauthorization called for a
Superfund of up to $10 billion, an amount palpably more reasonable than the $1.6 billion
figure. See House Passes Superfund Reauthorization, THE WEEK IN CONGRESS, CONG. INDEX
(CCH) (Dec. 13, 1985). An impasse developed, however, that threatened any meaningful con-
gressional action, primarily because the Senate insisted upon a $7.5 billion Superfund program
and partial funding of the program by a manufacturers' excise tax. Budget Bill Stalls Adjourn-
ment, THE WEEK IN CONGRESS, CONG. INDEX (CCH) (Dec. 20, 1985). As a result, final
"action [remained] uncertain because of the difficulties conference committee members [had]
in resolving differences between the House and Senate Bills." Dombrowski, Who Will Pay
Hazwaste Cleanup Bill?, MGMT. OF WORLD WASTE, Feb. 1986, at 42. On October 2, 1986,
however, House and Senate conferees agreed on a $9 billion, five-year Superfund program.
Hanlon, Superfund Reauthorization Compromise Includes Oil Import Fee, 33 TAX NOTES, Oct.
6, 1986, at 13. "The majority of the revenues would come from a substantial increase in the
Superfund petroleum taxes, combined with a broad-based tax on manufacturers. The confer-
ees reimposed the prior law petroleum feedstock taxes .... Id. In addition general revenues
and "interest and cost recoveries from polluters" would be funding sources. Id.
Prompt passage of the compromise legislation by both the House and the Senate occurred
notwithstanding a threatened veto by the President because of the broad-based taxes on petro-
leum and the corporate earnings of the manufacturing sector. See House Passes $9 Billion
Superfund, Cincinnati Enquirer, Oct. 9, 1986, at A1, col. 1; Senate Dares Reagan in Superfund
Approval, Cincinnati Enquirer, Oct. 4, 1986, at A3, col. 1. Despite his threats of veto, the
President signed the Superfund legislation into law stating, "[tihe bill's financing has real con-
cerns, but the health and safety of Americans are among the highest priorities of government
.... Cleanup Fund Gets $9 Billion, Cincinnati Enquirer, Oct. 18, 1986, at A3, col. 1.
35. See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
36. See Karien, Pollution: Now the Bad News, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 8, 1985, at 26. The
article chronicles three reports that reflect the dire level of pollution extant today:
One, a congressional survey, indicated that toxic chemicals are being emitted
into the air in more places-and in higher quantities-than ever suspected. An-
other, from the World Resources Institute, revealed data showing that acid rain
poses a threat not just to the Eastern Seaboard, but to millions of acres of West-
ern wilderness and timberlands as well. And a third survey, this one from previ-
ously undisclosed Public Health Service records, listed 1,484 sites that have been
closed or restricted because of toxic contamination so severe that they threaten
human health.
Id. Specifically, in connection with Superfund, "Only about 600 of the 20,000 dump sites in
America are on the NPL [National Priority List, a toxic waste clean-up priority list authorized
under Superfund]. Consequently, potential defendants responsible for the wastes on non-NPL
sites can be fairly certain that the government will be unlikely to begin removal at these sites
for many years, if ever." Seng, The Quasi-Contractual Nature of Cost-Recovery Actions Under
CERCLA, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 85, 175 (1985) (footnote omitted).
37. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (1982) (victim compensation on strict liability
standard); Hazardous Substance Account Act of 1981, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 25186, 25300-25395 (West 1984) (also known as the California Superfund); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 376.12 (West Supp. 1981) (Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act applies to
damage payment from nonhazardous spills to vessel or land); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
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Given this situation, the future threat of environmental harm is potentially
as great, or perhaps even greater, than the menace is today. 38
B. Available Means of Reducing the Risk
The most publicized efforts to abate the risk of harm from human expo-
sure to toxic substances or hazardous wastes have been spawned in the pub-
lic sector at the federal legislative level. 39 Of the environmental statutes that
Congress has enacted, those of special importance in controlling toxic sub-
stances or hazardous wastes are: (1) the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act;4° (2) the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act;41
(3) the Safe Drinking Water Act;42 (4) the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act;43 (5) the Clean Air Act;44 (6) the Toxic Substances Control Act;45 and,
as previously noted, (7) the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (Superfund). 4 6 All of these federal statutory
responses constitute a laudable effort to alleviate the environmental degrada-
tion problem. Their cardinal deficiency, however, is that they do not provide
any form of victim compensation for injuries arising from the improper dis-
posal of toxic substances or hazardous wastes. 47 This flaw is a significant
part of the toxic tort victim's dilemma. 48
1. Federal Laws
a. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Although per-
haps inappropriately named,49 RCRA plays an integral role in the federal
214, § 7A (West 1981) (10 or more Massachusetts citizens can seek injunction for state/local
environmental law violations).
38. This bleak forecast is based on information reflecting an increasingly severe problem
with no apparent signs of curtailment. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DELAYS IN
SETTING WORKPLACE STANDARDS FOR CANCER-CAUSING DANGEROUS CHEMICALS 9
(1977), cited in Trauberman, supra note 19, at 179 n.3; Note, Causation in Acid Rain Litiga-
tion: Facilitating Proof with Joint Liability Theories, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REv. 657, 657-59 [herein-
after cited as Note, Causation]; Note, supra note 24, at 1299-300.
39. The commerce clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, provides Congress's
authority for enacting the various federal environmental statutes.
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
41. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136, 136a-136y (1982).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1982).
43. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982, as amended 1986).
47. Some response costs are available to governmental units and individuals for removal
and remedial action and related expenses under the Superfund legislation, but they are ex-
tremely limited and fall far short of being a meaningful form of compensatory relief. 42 U.S.C.
§ 961 l(a)(l)-(2) (1982). Medical expenses and property damages, for example, are not recov-
erable as response costs. Note, supra note 23, at 806.
48. Congress has not responded very sympathetically to the plight of the toxic tort expo-
sure victim. For example, Congress has spurned repeated attempts to include a victim com-
pensation provision in Superfund. Some, however, remain optimistic that victim
compensation will soon come to fruition. Address by J. William Futrell, Hazardous Wastes,
Superfund and Toxic Substances Conference (Nov. 1, 1985).
49. Although RCRA does relate to natural resource conservation and recovery, the over-
arching concern of the Act "is the effect on the population and the environment of the disposal
1986]
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government's assault on hazardous waste disposal. The Act prevents the
discarding of hazardous wastes under circumstances that create an imminent
and substantial endangerment to human health and the environment. 50 Key
components of this proscription are "imminent" (the statute does not pro-
hibit a consummate danger)5I and "substantial," which requires a balancing
process, weighing the benefits against the costs.5 2
Apart from the overall prohibition against discarding hazardous wastes in
manners posing threats to health and the environment, the mechanism that
plays a prominent role in fostering the objectives of RCRA is what is com-
monly referred to as the "cradle-to-grave" requirements.53 These provisions
prescribe rather stringent conditions under which hazardous waste is to be
handled from the generator to the transporter and eventually to the disposal
facility.54 Once hazardous wastes leave the site of generation, handlers,
through a manifest system, account for the wastes throughout the disposal
process. The generator must initiate the manifest, fully describing the nature
and qualities of the waste;55 the transporter must then sign the manifest re-
flecting what material the generator has entrusted to him;56 finally, the dis-
poser must execute the manifest to reflect the nature and qualities of waste
that he actually accepts for disposal.5 7 To be sure, the cradle-to-grave provi-
sions serve a laudable purpose and, if followed, engender an accounting sys-
tem for hazardous waste disposal that should greatly alleviate the risks
attendant to this activity.58
of discarded hazardous wastes-those which by virtue of their composition or longevity are
harmful, toxic or lethal." H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6238, 6241 (1976).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982).
51. The court alluded to the imminent and substantial endangerment requirement in
United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870, 885 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
52. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 537-38 (8th Cir. 1975).
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6926 (1982).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 6922(5). This statutory requirement applies only to off-site disposal of hazard-
ous wastes. Id.
56. Id. § 6923(a)(3), (4).
57. Id. § 6924(2). Moreover, the EPA must properly issue a permit to disposal facilities
before the facilities can operate lawfully. Id. § 6925(a).
58. Unfortunately, the hazardous waste disposal approach mandated in RCRA is ignored
much too often. Nightmarish stories of clandestine midnight disposals of hazardous or toxic
wastes in unapproved areas are common. See EPA Summary of Removal Actions at Hazardous
Waste Sites Under Superfund Law, 14 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 13561 (Nov. 18, 1983) (contami-
nants discovered in containers on beach in Laguna Beach, California; midnight dumping of
PCBs in Baldwin, Florida; abandoned drum found in stream in East St. Louis, Illinois; corro-
sive chemicals in drums illegally dumped at truck stop in Jackson, Mississippi).
The Environmental Protection Agency says that at least 14,000 illegal dump
sites pose fire hazards, threaten groundwater, or emit fumes. And many envi-
ronmentalists say that figure is low. U.S. industries generate 88 billion pounds
of toxic waste a year, they claim, and 90 percent of that has been improperly
disposed of.
Smith, Midnight Dumping, 6 OMNI, Mar. 1984, at 116; see Miller & Miller, The Midnight
Dumpers, USA TODAY, Mar. 1985, at 61, 62 (only a matter of time before toxic time bombs
explode). The FBI is making a feeble effort to crackdown on midnight dumping. Note, The
Role of Injunctive Relief and Settlements in Superfund Enforcement, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
706, 708 n.18 (1983).
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Although RCRA is a significant spoke in the environmental protection
wheel, the Act provides no method for a toxic or hazardous exposure victim
to recover monetary damages for injuries suffered. First, the proscription in
the Act is against imminent endangerments; the risk that causes an exposure
victim's injuries has already materialized. Second, beyond the substantive
violation question, RCRA is inadequate remedially. Basically, the remedy
available under the Act is injunctive in nature. Since injunctions are a form
of equitable, not legal, relief, they simply terminate the offensive activity and
do not place monetary compensation in the hands of an injured party.
b. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).
FIFRA was enacted to impede the risk of harm emanating from the im-
proper use and disposal of pesticides.59 Its most noteworthy feature is the
provision that requires registration of pesticides with the EPA prior to their
use. To be eligible for registration the pesticide must not, in the determina-
tion of the EPA, have the capability of creating unreasonable adverse effects
on the environment. 60 If a pesticide fails this criterion, its use will not be
authorized. 6 1
Facially, FIFRA seems to offer significant protection from toxic or haz-
ardous exposure injury. Here again, however, the available remedy does not
embrace victim compensation. 62 More significantly, FIFRA has failed mis-
erably in terms of meeting its substantive goals. Very few pesticides have
been properly registered since FIFRA's enactment, 63 and, consequently, en-
vironmental dangers remain unchecked. Thus, FIFRA, in practice, has of-
fered little in the way of curbing the unreasonable risk of injury arising from
exposure to toxic or hazardous pesticides."
59. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136, 136a-136y (1982).
60. Id. § 136a(a) (5). Too many pesticides remain unregistered. W. RODGERS, ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW 857 (1977). Bureaucratic uncertainty has "resulted in a great deal of contro-
versy holding up the registration of several pesticides." Id. at 863. Notably, the agricultural
use of pesticides is one of the prime sources of water pollution. R. FINDLEY & D. FARBER,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 99 (1983). Thus, exposure to water contaminated by
pesticides may cause hazardous or toxic exposure injuries.
61. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(6) (1982). On paper, FIFRA looks good. In practice, however,
the results have been different. Some now consider the Act an unmitigated disaster. Address
by A. Alm, Environmental Law Conference (Feb. 23, 1984). This condemnation has raised
strong doubts about the likelihood of the Act's reauthorization. Id. Legislative activity in this
area was evident, however, as recently as the spring of 1986. See Davis, Panel Slogs Through
Markup of New Pesticide Legislation, CONG. Q., June 14, 1986, at 1370.
62. As noted earlier, this omission is a common shortcoming of the various federal envi-
ronmental statutes. Enforcement actions generally grounded upon the power of injunction are
the ordinary means of relief. See Note, The Burden of Proof, supra note 19, at 210-11; see also
Note, Developments in Victim Compensation Legislation: A Look Beyond the Superfund Act of
1980, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 271, 271 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Note, Developments]
(problem of absence of effective system of victim compensation for injuries caused by exposure
to toxic chemicals has recently received increased attention).
63. "Approximately 45,000 pesticide products are currently marketed in the United
States. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulates these products primarily on
the basis of their pesticidal active ingredients. There are roughly 1,400 'active ingredients' in
the 45,000 products now on the market." U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PESTICIDES
FACT BOOK 1 (1986).
64. Note, David's Copperfield and FIFRA's Labelling Misadventures, 4 NOVA L.J. 107,
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c. The Safe Drinking Water Act. The contamination of existing potable
water supplies by toxic substances or hazardous wastes is one of the most
serious forms of environmental pollution extant today.65 Groundwater is a
primary water source that is frequently threatened by the leaching of im-
properly disposed toxic substances or hazardous wastes. 66 This subterra-
nean water supply furnishes water in varying percentages, depending on the
region of the country, for human and animal consumption, industrial uses,
and agricultural purposes.67 Moreover, reliance upon groundwater contin-
ues to rise steadily as surface water supplies dwindle or become more
polluted.
The Safe Drinking Water Act 68 is one promising statute for groundwater
pollution victims. 69 Basically, the Act interdicts those intrusions into the
ground of contaminants that create an imminent endangerment to existent
public water supplies. 70 The only substantive limitation upon the attractive-
ness of the Safe Drinking Water Act in protecting groundwater is that the
Act does not apply to private water supplies7 1 such as private wells. 7 2 Conse-
quently, those exposed to toxic substances or hazardous wastes because of
the contamination of private wells do not have claims that fall under the
provisions of the Safe Drinking Water Act. 73 At the risk of being tautologi-
cal, a glaring deficiency of the Safe Drinking Water Act is the absence of a
victim compensation provision.74 This deficiency does not bode well for a
107 (1980) (EPA's enforcement of FIFRA may create same pesticide pollution problems EPA
seeks to prevent).
65. Living organisms, including humans, must have fresh water to sustain life. See 1 U.S.
WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, THE NATION'S WATER RESOURCES 1975-2000, at 60, 66
(1979).
66. R. FREEZE & J. CHERRY, GROUNDWATER 436 (1978).
67. Id. at 6-7 (table 1.2 and figure 1.3), relying on statistics appearing in Murray, Water
Use, Consumption, and Outlook in the US. in 1970, 65 J. AM. WATER WORKS A. 302-08
(1973) (groundwater, less important in industrial usage, provides significant percentage of sup-
ply for rural and urban domestic use and irrigation).
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1982). The Safe Drinking Water Act was recently amended,
and the President signed the amendments on June 19, 1986. See Pub. L. No. 99-339, 100 Stat.
642 (1986). Some of the preeminent provisions of the new legislation are: (1) requiring the
EPA to establish national primary drinking water regulations (Q 101); (2) strengthening the
EPA's enforcement authority regarding underground injection of hazardous wastes that en-
danger underground sources of drinking water (§ 202); and (3) initiating a program "to protect
critical acquifer protection areas located within areas designated as sole or principal source
acquifiers" (§ 203).
69. Note, Toxic Substance Contamination, supra note 19, at 58. The author also lists the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the RCRA as other promising statutes.
70. Underground waste injections are principal targets of the Safe Drinking Water Act,
although the Act proscribes other intrusive acts that endanger the quality of public water
supplies as well. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1982).
71. Id. § 300f(4) defines "public water system" as "a system for the provision to the public
of piped water for human consumption, if such system has at least fifteen service connections
or regularly serves at least twenty-five individuals."
72. Note, Toxic Substance Contamination, supra note 19, at 58.
73. See Johnson v. Tipton, 103 I11. App. 3d 291, 431 N.E.2d 464, 467 (1982). No cause of
action existed under the Safe Drinking Water Act for the contamination of the plaintiff's well.
Hence, at no point in this common law toxic tort action was there any mention of the Act.
74. "Most of the imminent hazard provisions limit available relief to immediate injunc-
tions." Note, Toxic Substance Contamination, supra note 19, at 59.
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toxic tort exposure victim who invariably desires some form of compensa-
tory relief for injuries suffered.
d. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act). The
Clean Water Act 75 is one of the most important federal environmental stat-
utes. The Act is significant to the toxic tort exposure victim because of its
provisions proscribing the unauthorized dumping of toxic or hazardous pol-
lutants into surface waters.76 A cause of action is available, at least for in-
junctive relief, under the Act.77 The Clean Water Act, however, does not
extend to victim compensation, a deficiency common among federal environ-
mental statutes.
Significant sentiment exists that the Clean Water Act does not pertain to
the insidious environmental threat of toxic or hazardous waste contamina-
tion of groundwater. 78 At the crux of the problem is whether the term "nav-
igable waters, ' ' 79 to which the Clean Water Act applies, encompasses
groundwater. To date, courts have resolved this issue inconsistently, at least
in regard to the injection of hazardous waste into underground wells.80
Ironically, one of the most significant environmental statutes may actually
be impotent when it comes to addressing one of the most pressing toxic or
hazardous exposure problems today. 8'
75. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1275-1376 (1982).
76. See id. § 131 l(a) (discharging pollutants in violation of the applicable effluent limita-
tions is illegal); see also Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 105 S. Ct. 1102, 84 L. Ed. 2d 90
(1985) (Supreme Court read into statute fundamentally different factor, or FDF, variance for
toxic water pollutants).
77. The EPA, when seeking to enjoin such activity, is not completely stymied by scientific
uncertainty concerning the toxicity of the pollutant. The statute mandates that the EPA take
those actions necessary to provide an "ample margin of safety." 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(4) (1982).
As a consequence, the EPA, for example, has been able to prohibit successfully the dumping of
low chlorinated PCBs into surface waters, although scientific knowledge of possible deleterious
effects was virtually limited to more chlorinated PCBs. See Environmental Defense Fund v.
EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 83-85 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
78. See Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1329-31 (5th Cir. 1977).
79. Courts have generally been liberal in applying the "navigable waters" criterion, found
in 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982), in connection with surface waters. See W. RODGERS, supra
note 60, § 4.5, at 390 ("[t]he test of navigability is whether the watercourse could be used for
commerce, not whether it is used, and this inquiry extends to 'the distant past and extended
future' ") (citing United States v. Sunset Cove, Inc., 3 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.)
20,370, 20,372 (D.C. Or. 1973), aff'd in part, 514 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1975)).
80. See Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977) (discharges into deep
wells exempt); United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (no
protection under the Clean Water Act). But see United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d
822, 852 (7th Cir. 1977) (EPA does have authority). The EPA has not alleviated the problem
by asserting jurisdiction in connection with groundwater in terms of § 208 area-wide manage-
ment. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1982); T. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 26, at 743.
81. Congress should fill this gap when it reauthorizes the Clean Water Act, an action it is
currently debating. Address by Senator Stafford, Hazardous Wastes, Superfund, and Toxic
Substances Conference (Oct. 31, 1985). But see W. RODGERS, supra note 60, § 4.6, at 401
(cases interpreting 1972 amendments to Clean Water Act uniformly reject navigability restric-
tions). In the Clean Water Act of 1977 "the Act's definition of 'navigable waters' as 'the
waters of the United States' makes it clear that the term 'navigable' as used in the Act is of
limited import." United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 455, 462, 88 L.
Ed. 2d 419, 430 (1985). But see Reagan Vetoes Water Bill, Cincinnati Enquirer, Nov. 7, 1986,
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e. The Toxic Substances Control Act (TOSCA). Of all the federal envi-
ronmental statutes TOSCA 82 provides the most comprehensive regulation of
toxic substances, most notably industrial chemicals. The Act proscribes
those toxic substances that create an unreasonable risk of harm or injury to
health and the environment. 83 One should underscore "unreasonable" in
describing the unacceptable risk embraced by the language of the statute.
This all important determination of reasonableness often involves balancing
competing interests in a manner similar to that used in nuisance cases. 84
The gravity of the harm threatened must overshadow the social utility of the
activity producing the injury before courts will deem the risk unreasonable
and thus invoke the statute.85
Even though a court may determine that a chemical creates an unreason-
able risk, the statute is simply regulatory;86 its violation does not entitle the
victim to any form of compensatory damages. 87 Here again, a federal envi-
ronmental statute's inutility to the toxic substance or hazardous waste expo-
sure victim is painfully evident. 88
f The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (Superfund).89 Superfund is primarily designed to provide the
EPA with authority and resources to clean up the worst of the increasing
at A18, col. 1 (citing costs, President pocket vetoed clean Water Amendments Act of 1986 on
Nov. 6, 1986).
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
83. Id. § 2601(a)(2).
84. A use or activity only amounts to a public or private nuisance if the activity consti-
tutes an unreasonable interference with a protected interest. Generally, the plaintiff must show
that the gravity of harm involved outweighs the social value of the activity. See RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS §§ 826, 828 (1939). More recently, some courts have sought guidance from
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826, 829A (1977), which adopts an alternative
balancing calculus that increases the likelihood of finding an unreasonable interference:
An intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land is
unreasonable if (a) the gravity of harm outweighs the utility of the actor's con-
duct, or (b) the harm caused by the conduct is serious and the financial burden
of compensating for this and similar harm to others would not make the contin-
uation of the conduct not feasible.
Id. § 826.
85. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267, 1277-79 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (court examines unreasonable risk regulatory standard of TOSCA in connection with
the restriction and control of PCBs).
86. Note, supra note 23, at 804 n.32. Existing federal statutes "seek to control the behav-
ior of the polluter rather than to compensate the victims of polluting conduct." Id.
87. Id. at 806 n.36.
88. The provision of TOSCA that has generally been most ineffectual is the one mandat-
ing the premanufacture notification to the EPA for new chemical substances. Very few illumi-
nating notifications have actually occurred, primarily because chemical manufacturers allege
confidentiality and that the use and disclosure of this information offends the Trade Secrets
Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136(h) (1982). But see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862, 81 L.
Ed. 2d 815 (1984). The Court held that the EPA's use or disclosure of similar information
concerning pesticides obtained under FIFRA did not violate the fifth amendment taking
clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 4. 104 S. Ct. at 2876, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 835. Because of the
EPA's inability to obtain vital information about the toxicity of many chemicals currently in
use, the EPA has essentially been forced to regulate in the dark.
89. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
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number of hazardous waste sites.90 Superfund's central feature is now a $9
billion fund9 1 that primarily permits the EPA to clean up hazardous waste
sites before attempting to recover the costs of such cleanup from the respon-
sible parties. 92 Strict liability is the standard of liability imposed upon a
responsible party;93 this liability is generally considered to be joint and sev-
eral.94 To be sure, these touchstones inure to the benefit of the government
when seeking recovery of cleanup costs. 95 Secondarily, Superfund also im-
poses liability up to $50 million for damages to governmentally owned natu-
ral resources resulting from the release of hazardous substances.
96
But where does Superfund leave an individual victim of exposure from a
hazardous waste site? The answer is quite simple, but all too common: the
individual must pursue compensatory relief in state courts, normally pursu-
ant to common law theories, for Superfund has no general victim compensa-
tion provision.97  The lack of authority for awarding individuals
compensatory relief is more apparent here than in, perhaps, any other fed-
eral environmental statute because Congress has repeatedly rebuffed efforts
to place a victim compensation provision in Superfund.
98
90. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES POSE INVESTI-
GATION, EVALUATION, SCIENTIFIC, AND LEGAL PROBLEMS 39 (1981).
91. The $1.6 billion revolving fund expired at the end of fiscal 1985. Congress passed new
Superfund legislation recently, however, and the President signed it into law. See supra note
34.
92. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE U.S., supra note 90, at 2.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(32) (1982). The liability standard under this section of Superfund is
the same as that under § 311 of the Clean Water Act, which imposes strict liability. See
United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 843-44 (W.D.
Mo. 1984).
94. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 807-08 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
Congress specifically rejected efforts to provide expressly for joint and several liability in
Superfund legislation. Some courts, however, have implied such liability because Congress has
never specifically precluded the liability by statutory language. Id. Others have looked to
principles of joint and several liability embodied in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433B (1964). But see Epstein, Two Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 73 GEO. L.J. 1377,
1382-88 (1985) (application of joint and several liability would hold all defendants equally
liable for clean-up costs even though their fractional contributions might vary widely).
95. The advantages of not having to implicate a responsible party's conduct by establish-
ing fault are self-evident. Even more significant, however, is that "entire liability" offers the
government the opportunity to recover the entire amount of the clean-up costs from any one of
several possible responsible parties.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(1)(D) (1982).
97. The Superfund legislation does create a right of action, justiciable in federal
court, for private and nonfederal plaintiffs to recover necessary "response" costs
resulting from a release of hazardous substances .... This provision, however,
only provides for compensation of limited response costs, specifically precluding
money damages for medical expenses, property loss, and so-called health pro-
phylactic damages.
Note, supra note 23, at 806 (footnote omitted).
98. Congress initially included a victim compensation provision in the Superfund legisla-
tion just enacted. As expected, the chances for its passage were nil. Address by F. Grad,
Environmental Law Conference (1984). Some individuals, however, continue to maintain that
victim compensation is not a dead legislative issue. Address by J. Futrell, Hazardous Wastes,
Superfund and Toxic Substances Conference (Oct. 31-Nov. 2, 1985). Mr. Futrell is the Presi-
dent of the Environmental Law Institute.
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g. Concluding Remarks on Federal Environmental Statutory Protections.
Two writers, recently commenting on Superfund, observed that it contains
"1no provisions for the recovery of damages for personal injury and property
damage resulting from exposure to hazardous wastes." 99 This statement can
be fairly ascribed to all of the primary federal environmental statutes, 100 thus
greatly undermining the adequacy of a federal cause of action resulting from
an environmental toxic tort.' 0 ' Consequently, in the federal sector, a haz-
ardous or toxic waste exposure victim cannot reach even the arcane ques-
tions of statute of limitations, causation, and apportionment of damages, for
no private cause of action for damages exists for transgression of the various
federal environmental statutes. 10 2
This major shortcoming of federal law fosters a situation marked by inad-
equate compensation, less than desirable deterrence, and little, if any, correc-
tive justice between the parties. '0 3 Against this backdrop, it is clear that
"[i]ndividual victims cannot be ignored today in the hope that government
may decide to protect the common weal tomorrow." °4 Until Congress acts
positively, however, individual victims must focus upon state statutory and
common law to seek redress for their toxic or hazardous exposure injuries.
2. State Environmental Statutes
"Environmental protection is now one of society's imperatives, and, ac-
cordingly, is perceived as one of government's fundamental responsibili-
ties."' 1 5 That this responsibility is shared by both the federal government
and its state counterparts is well-established. ' 06 In pursuit of this objective,
several states have enacted environmental protection legislation 10 7 and es-
99. Zazzali & Grad, supra note 4, at 446.
100. See supra notes 49-98 and accompanying text.
101. Zazzali & Grad, supra note 4, at 458-59.
102. The United States Supreme Court quelled any notion that some federal common law
cause of action might overcome the deficiency of the federal statutes when the Court held that
the detailed provisions of the Clean Water Act signaled preemption of the federal common law
of nuisance with respect to interstate water pollution. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304, 326 (1981). The same rationale probably applies to the Clean Air Act and perhaps to
other federal environmental statutes as well. See R. FINDLEY & D. FARBER, supra note 60, at
64.
103. Congress's unwillingness, to date, to add a victim compensation provision to the fed-
eral environmental statutes may not be grounded on sound policy notions; rather, a more
plausible explanation is that no political consensus exists in Congress to support this provision.
"CERCLA was originally drafted with a provision for victim compensation, but this provision
was deleted in a compromise with legislators perceived as necessary to secure Congress' ap-
proval of the Act." Note, Developments, supra note 62, at 272 n.5.
104. Zazzali & Grad, supra note 4, at 474. If the individuals who cause the damages bear
the cost, which generally does not occur in toxic tort litigation, these individuals contribute to
the general welfare.
105. Note, Successor Landowner Liability for Environmental Torts: Robbing Peter to Pay
Paul?, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 329, 329 (1982).
106. Id. at 329-30 n.3. Federal environmental statutes have granted significant implemen-
tation responsibilities to the states. The Clean Air Act grants the basic responsibility for devel-
oping a State Implementation Plan, and for granting variances to its provisions, to the states.
42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982).
107. Perhaps out of practical necessity, New Jersey has been a pioneer state in regard to
environmental legislation. See New Jersey Solid Waste Management Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
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tablished agencies to enforce these laws. 10 8
Verdicts on the effectiveness of these state laws have been mixed. 109 Most
state statutes provide principally for injunctive relief, like their federal coun-
terparts."10 This flaw diminishes the utility of these statutes to toxic tort
victims.III In a rare instance, California has enacted a statute that provides
for actual compensation of the victim of an environmental tort for personal
injuries or property damage.'" 2 Otherwise, exposure victims have had to
resort to the relevant state workers' compensation laws for occupational ex-
posure injuries and traditional common law doctrines for nonoccupational
injuries. 113 The proof requirements for causation are slightly less onerous in
the workers' compensation field than for common law torts, but proof
problems persist in both.' 14 Hence, establishing the requisite causal connec-
tion between the toxic or hazardous exposure brought on by the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered by the plaintiff is a conundrum irrespective
of the particular legal forum.
§§ 13:IE-1 to -48 (West 1979); New Jersey Air Pollution Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 26:2C-1 to -36 (West 1964 & Supp. 1986); New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act,
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11 to . lz (West 1982); New Jersey Water Pollution Control
Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58.10A-1 to -20 (West 1982). California and Minnesota have also
enacted environmental legislation with progressive victim compensation models. See Califor-
nia Hazardous Substances Account Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25300-25395
(West 1984 & Supp. 1985); Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act, MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 115B.01-115.24 (West 1984 & Supp. 1985).
108. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-908 (1976), for example, authorizes the Arkansas Pollution
Control and Ecology Department.
109. The problem may not lie with the substantive features of the various state environ-
mental statutes, but rather with the state enforcement mechanisms. Inadequate financing and
staffing of the environmental agencies, coupled with a strong undercurrent of political pres-
sure, have adversely affected the efficacy of the enforcement of state environmental laws.
Moreover, most state environmental protection acts (SEPAs) specifically do not cover private
activities. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 133A-4(2) (1983); VA. CODE § 10-178 (1985). Some SEPAs
do not even mandate compliance by local governments. See MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 1-
301(d) (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-8 (1983). For a detailed discussion of the parameters
of SEPAs see Pridgeon, Anderson & Delphey, State Environmental Policy Acts. A Survey of
Recent Developments, 2 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 419 (1977).
110. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (1982) (victim compensation on strict liability
standard); Hazardous Substance Account Act of 1981, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 25186, 25300-25395 (West 1984) (also known as the California Superfund); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 376.12 (West Supp. 1981) (Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act applies to
damage payment from nonhazardous spills to vessel or land); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
214, § 7A (West 1981) (10 or more Massachusetts citizens can seek injunction for state/local
environmental law violations).
11. See Comment, Common Law and the Toxic Tort.: Where Does Superfund Leave the
Private Victim of Toxic Torts?, 86 DICK. L. REV. 725, 735 (1982) (although a victim-based
statute, Superfund fails to compensate victims).
112. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25300-25395 (West 1984 & Supp. 1985).
113. Here again the traditional common law tort theories are generally strict tort liability,
private and public nuisance, trespass, and negligence. Note, supra note 105, at 330.
114. Moreover, workers' compensation laws, although dispensing with fault requirements
and, generally, dispensing with the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence, assumption
of the risk, and the fellow servant doctrine, contain limitations to recovery and are usually an
employee's exclusive remedy against the employer. An action in tort against a third-party




3. Common Law Theories
Unlike the various federal and state environmental statutes, which are ba-
sically regulatory, the common law tort system extends the prospect of com-
pensatory relief to a toxic tort victim. Whether the cause of action is
grounded in trespass, negligence, public or private nuisance, strict liability in
tort, or strict products liability in tort," 5 the likelihood exists that the expo-
sure victim will receive some measure of compensation for his or her inju-
ries, provided the victim successfully prosecutes his or her suit.1 16 Because
of this possibility the common law of torts appears at first blush to be the
most promising means of providing relief for injuries suffered from environ-
mental torts. Upon serious reflection, however, the traditional common law
of torts may not be so promising, at least in its unadulterated form." 7
Under each of the traditional tort theories, for example, proof of causation is
an essential predicate for recovery. Proof of causation may create a virtually
insurmountable hurdle for the victim because of the unique nature of a toxic
tort injury.1 8  This Article later examines the causation element in an at-
tempt to ascertain a less onerous means by which causation may be estab-
lished in a toxic tort suit.'1 9
4. Scientific Prophylactic Alternatives: An Ounce of Prevention May Be
Worth More Than a Pound of Cure
Scientific knowledge is a major underpinning of effective environmental
protection.120 Specifically, science plays a prominent role as a predictor of
the environmental consequences of a certain activity. In the acid rain con-
troversy, for example, science has benefitted society by determining that
scrubbers in the smokestacks of coal plants and smelters can mitigate sulfur
dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions and thus alleviate the incidence of-ruin-
ous acid rain pollution. 21 In the scientifically based effluent limitations
115. A cause of action in tort may also lie on tortious misrepresentation. See Starling v.
Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183, 192 (S.D. Ga. 1982) (fraud claim based on asbes-
tos exposure).
116. In certain circumstances courts may grant punitive or exemplary damages in addition
to compensatory damages. The standards for making a punitive damages award vary fromjurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the common requirement seems to be an element of conscious
wrongdoing. C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 188 (1935).
117. "Unadulterated form" means traditional tort principles, free from any significant
modification.
118. See Note, Developments, supra note 62, at 272-73 (toxic tort plaintiffs must carry the
traditional burden of proving causation). The principal factors complicating the causation
question are latency and causal indeterminancy. Id. at 273 n.9.
119. See infra notes 134-255 and accompanying text.
120. Ironically, a frequently cited reason for the deficiencies in the regulatory control of the
environment under the various federal and state statutes is the lack of scientific certainty. See
Trubatch, Informed Judicial Decisionmaking: A Suggestion for a Judicial Office for Under-
standing Science and Technology, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 255, 255-56 (1985). Industry un-
doubtedly has an economic stake, and, as a result, sometimes claims "that regulations are too
stringent and not supported by scientific evidence." Id. at 256. Industry perhaps may even use
scientific uncertainty as a ruse to avoid additional costs associated with the utilization of ad-
vanced scientific knowledge to prevent further environmental degradation.
121. Although little doubt exists about the effectiveness of scrubbers in relieving the acid
rain problem, industry continues to maintain that scrubber costs outweigh the environmental
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under the Clean Water Act 122 and emission limitations under the Clean Air
Act, 12 3 Congress and the EPA have formulated within the statutes them-
selves and through administrative regulation and rulemaking an essentially
scientific prediction of what is an acceptable level of water and air pollu-
tion. 1 24 These limitations are simply predictions of the greatest amount of
water and air pollution reasonably allowable without creating an undue dan-
ger to human health and the environment. 125 Stated somewhat differently,
these limitations are the minimum prophylactic standards to which industry
must comply in order to protect the environment.' 26
Science not only fulfills its role as a prognosticator in the various ways
mentioned above, but it also can help prevent deleterious degradations of the
environment by devising alternative means for the disposal of pollutants. A
perfect case in point is the disposal of toxic or hazardous wastes. Toxic or
hazardous waste sites pose a significant risk of contamination to ground-
water supplies.127 Scientific studies suggest that burning most, if not all, of
this waste may be a feasible alternative. 128 Burning the wastes would allevi-
risk. Reagan's Reaction Cautious to Proposal on Acid Rain, Cincinnati Enquirer, Jan. 9, 1986,
at A-3, col. 1, states that: "The Edison Electric Institute, which represents most private utili-
ties... backs clean-coal technology, aimed at removing sulfur from coal as it is burning, an
alternative to the expensive but effective process of scrubbing it from exhaust."
122. Beginning in 1972, Congress decided to regulate water pollution from point sources
on the basis of technology-based effluent limitations (discharge standards). In ascending order
of compliance date and stringency, these limitations are best practicable control technology
available by July 1, 1977; best conventional technology by July 1, 1984; and best available
technology economically achievable by July 1, 1984. 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b) (1982).
123. Under the Clean Air Act the EPA administrator has established primary and secon-
dary National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQSs) for several critical pollutants: car-
bon monoxide, lead, ozone, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen oxide. Each state must, in its state
implementation plan, devise a strategy or mix of approaches to meet the primary NAAQSs as
expeditiously as practicable, but not later than three years, and the secondary NAAQSs within
a reasonable time. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-7410 (1982).
124. To get a § 402 pollution permit to discharge effluents into a navigable stream, for
example, a polluter has to meet the applicable technology-based federal effluent limitations or
state ambient water quality standards, if the state standards are more stringent than the federal
standards. Otherwise, the effluent discharge will be in violation of the Clean Water Act.
125. Note that neither the Clean Water Act nor the Clean Air Act call for an abrupt
cessation of water and air pollution. The major justification for this gradual approach is to
prevent economic turmoil. Congress does not approach the question of the quality of the
environment in a vacuum despite the importance of the issue. A countervailing factor is eco-
nomic output. Thus, subsumed within environmental law is a seemingly relentless quest to
strike an appropriate balance between economic growth on the one hand and the quality of the
environment on the other. See T. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 26, at 60.
126. A striking example of the minimal' nature of federal standards is the states' right to
adopt more stringent standards than those prescribed by federal laws and regluations. See
Homestake Mining Co. v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279, 1284 (D.S.D. 1979) (states clearly can
adopt more stringent standards than those in federal statute).
127. R. FREEZE & J. CHERRY, supra note 66, at 8. Contamination of the groundwater
may be the chief environmental threat facing this country. See supra notes 65-67 and accom-
panying text.
128. See, e.g., C. DIAL, HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT RESEARCH-U.S. ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA, Cincinnati, Ohio, Hazardous Waste Engineering Re-
search Laboratory 1985) (treatment and thermal destruction among most viable methods for
disposing of hazardous wastes); F. HALL, W. KEMNER, G. ANNAMRAJU, R. KRISHNAN, M.
TAFT-FRANK & D. ALBRINCK, EVALUATION OF THE FEASIBILITY OF INCINERATING HAZ-
ARDOUS WASTE IN HIGH-TEMPERATURE INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES (EPA, Cincinnati, Ohio,
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ate the leaching problem associated with the threat to the groundwater cre-
ated by hazardous waste sites. 129 Of further importance in the preventive
role played by science are the monitoring 130 and modelling1 3 1 processes
aimed at keeping environmental pollution in check. Moreover, field and
laboratory studies are invaluable aids to effective environmental planning. 132
In summary, science is a good predictor; as such, its primary environmen-
tal role is preventive in nature. This role is vital because the cost of prevent-
ing an environmental disaster is generally much less than the cost of cleaning
up one. 133 Thus, through science, an ounce of prevention may be worth
more than a pound of cure.
Industrial Environmental Research Laboratory 1984) (identifies and examines many alterna-
tive methods of incineration in view of "time, temperature profile, geographical location, prod-
uct quality consideration, institutional factors, and environmental impacts"); D. OBERACKER,
HAZARDOUS WASTE INCINERATOR PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS BY THE U.S. ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA, Cincinnati, Ohio, Hazardous Waste Engineering Re-
search Laboratory 1984); A. TRENHOLM, P. GORMAN, G. JUNGCLAUS, PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION OF FULL-SCALE HAZARDOUS WASTE INCINERATORS, VOLUME II, INCINERA-
TOR PERFORMANCE RESULTS (EPA, Cincinnati, Ohio, Industrial Environmental Research
Laboratory 1984). Of course, if the byproducts of incineration are hazardous or toxic air
pollutants, this incineration could violate § 112 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982).
129. Scientifically approved waste site liners will also ameliorate the problem. "Natural
and manmade liners are currently being used to prevent or minimize seepage of polluting fluids
from surface impoundments and landfills.... Either they physically impede the flow of fluid;
or they absorb or retain contaminating, unwanted chemicals in the fluid." D. SHULTZ, FIELD
STUDIES OF LINER INSTALLATION METHODS AT LANDFILLS AND SURFACE IMPOUNDMENTS
1 (EPA, Cincinnati, Ohio, Municipal Environmental Research Laboratory 1984). Field obser-
vations made at twenty-one liner construction sites indicate that installers generally complied
with liner industry standards. Id. at 4. These standards, however, vary in terms of quality
control and testing requirements. Id. "No particular liner installation technique or procedure
guarantees a successful liner system." Id.
130. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7475(e)(2) (1982), provides that "analysis required by
this subsection shall include continuous air quality monitoring data gathered for purposes of
determining whether emissions from such facility will exceed the maximum allowable in-
creases or the maximum allowable concentration permitted under this part."
131. Id. § 7475(e)(3)(D) provides that regulations "shall specify with reasonable particular-
ity each air quality model or models to be used under specified sets of conditions for purposes
of this part." For a discussion of modeling and its utility under the Clean Air Act see Ed-
wards, Through the Crevices: Acid Rain and The Clean Air Act, 11 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 671,
693-97 (1984).
132. Knowing what will or could happen at a particular site regarding pollution is vital if
action is to be taken to control, alleviate, or prevent an environmental mishap. For example,
the length of time required for an acquifer to cleanse itself of pollutants is usually measured in
decades. To solve new or existing pollution occurrences, therefore, new strategies are based on
(1) detailed analysis of groundwater samples, (2) monitoring wells, (3) option assessment,
(4) site assessment, and (5) pollution control studies. These involve laboratory and field analy-
sis. D. MILLER, F. DELUCA & T. TESSIER, GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION IN NORTH-
EAST STATES 301-14 (EPA, Ada, Oklahoma, Robert S. Kerr Environmental Research
Laboratory 1974). Laboratory and field studies have provided well-established concepts for
the recovery and treatment of contaminated groundwater. Quince & Gardner, Recovery and
Treatment of Contaminated Ground Water (pt, 1), GROUND WATER MONITORING REV.,
Summer 1982, at 18, 22.
133. A good example of the adage that prevention is cheaper than cure is the Times Beach,
Missouri, environmental disaster. Cleanup costs incurred exceeded the amount that would
have been required to avert the dioxin contamination in the first place by millions of dollars.
For a discussion of the huge costs associated with pollution see T. SCHOENBAUM, supra note
26, at 8. The costs include: (1) "the loss of resources through unnecessary wasteful exploita-
tion, (2) the cost of pollution abatement control, (3) the cost in human health." Id.
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III. Toxic TORT LITIGATION: THE CAUSATION PROBLEM
A. Applying Traditional Tort Principles to the Nontraditional Toxic Tort:
A Conundrum
The application of traditional tort principles to toxic tort cases greatly
increases the difficulty of recovery by an exposure victim. 134 The simple ex-
planation for the unusual problems attendant to toxic tort litigation is that
traditional common law tort principles do not apply very well to this non-
traditional tort with its inherent idiosyncrasies, which were unknown when
the conventional rules evolved. 135 One of the more formidable roadblocks to
successful toxic tort litigation, from the exposure victim's perspective, is es-
tablishing the element of causation, an integral component of any toxic tort
case irrespective of the underlying liability theory.
136
Trial lawyers have the responsibility to protect tort victims. 137 Courts
also, informed by the analyses of many individuals, including legal scholars,
should explore theories that will reduce the plaintiff's burden with respect to
causation and at the same time promote the traditional policy objectives of
tort law. 138 This Article now focuses on modifications to the common law of
torts that may facilitate the application of the causation element to the field
of toxic torts.139
134. Note, supra note 1, at 583-84. "Causal indeterminacy ... creates great difficulties for
a toxic waste victim attempting to prove causation under common law rules." Id. at 584; see
Trauberman, supra note 19, at 197-201; Comment, "Close Encounters of the Toxic Kind"-
Toward an Amelioration of Substantive and Procedural Barriers for Latent Toxic Injury Plain-
tiffs, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 822, 824 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Close Encounters]; Note,
Establishing Causation in Chemical Exposure Cases: The Precursor Symptoms Theory, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 163, 180 (1982); see also Comment, Agent Orange as a Problem of Law and
Policy, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 48, 65-71 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Agent Orange]
(proof of causation is one of the greatest barriers to recovery by veterans for exposure to Agent
Orange).
One commentator noted that "[tihe evaluation of a personal injury case arising from expo-
sure to toxic materials presents a lawyer with a challenge of great dimensions." Landau, Hur-
dling the Barriers to Toxic Tort Recovery. An Update, TRIAL, Apr. 1983, at 40, 41.
135. The common law rules arguably operate reasonably well in connection with sporadic
accidents, the traditional type of circumstance that the tort system has been generally con-
cerned with over the years. But see Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 854. "Current criticism of the
tort system as a scheme too cumbersome, costly, and haphazard to accomplish its accident
prevention and compensation objectives ... suggests that our reliance on private damage ac-
tions is misplaced." Id. (footnote omitted) (citing J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTrERY
130, 140-45 (1979); Pierce, Encouraging Safety. The Limits of Tort Law and Government Reg-
ulation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1300 (1980)).
136. The toxic tort victim must overcome a number of barriers to prevail in private litiga-
tion. The victim must (1) meet the statute of limitations requirements, (2) identify responsible
defendants, and (3) indict the conduct of a specific defendant or a group of defendants. See
Note, Developments, supra note 62, at 272-73. One of the most sophisticated problems is meet-
ing the standards prescribed for complying with the burden of proof of causation. Rosenberg,
supra note 6, at 855.
137. Landau, supra note 134, at 41.
138. Compensation, deterrence, and corrective justice between the parties are generally rec-
ognized as the chief goals of tort law. See supra text accompanying note 8.




B. The Traditional Approach to Causation: Why It Fails
in Toxic Tort Cases
Because the various federal and state regulatory statutes provide no ade-
quate compensatory relief for harm suffered by a toxic substance or hazard-
ous waste exposure victim,' 4° private tort litigation is the primary, if not
exclusive, means of redressing such harm.141 Courts generally apply tradi-
tional tort principles, including those pertaining to causation,142 to ascertain
whether an alleged exposure victim's injury warrants recovery. The flaws of
the common law approach to causation in toxic tort litigation stem primarily
from the unique nature of a tortious injury resulting from the exposure to
toxic or hazardous wastes.143 These injuries generally remain dormant for a
number of years before manifesting themselves. 144 In addition, in the case of
groundwater contamination, defining the migration patterns of toxic sub-
stances or hazardous wastes through the soil frequently presents compli-
cated problems.145 Uncertainty as to the effects of hazardous substances on
the human body also has created significant hurdles to establishing a causal
nexus between the exposure resulting from the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's ensuing injuries. 146 In short, a plethora of uncertainty spawned
by prolonged latency periods and scientific causal indeterminacy portend
trouble for plaintiffs in lawsuits seeking damages for personal injury or prop-
erty damage resulting from exposure to toxic substances or hazardous
wastes. 147
140. For a discussion of this deficiency in the various environmental statutes see supra
notes 49-114 and accompanying text. See also Keller, Toxic Tort Litigation: The Management
Challenge, TRIAL, Apr. 1983, at 50, 51.
141. Keller, supra note 140, at 52.
142. Id.
143. The same problem also persists to some degree in cases involving exposure to hazard-
ous products. Although scientists know much about asbestos, for example, proof of causation
problems in asbestos cases are greater than in conventional tort actions. In any asbestos case
substantial problems may occur in demonstrating that the injury of the plaintiff resulted from
the exposure to asbestos for which the defendant was responsible. This was especially true a
few years ago when the probability of asbestos exposure was almost limitless, thus creating a
number of possible sources of exposure and reducing the likelihood of establishing causation
by the preponderance of the evidence.
144. See Levy, Radiation Litigation-The Emerging Tort Field, 1981 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE
568, 571 n.3 (asbestos exposure has a 15-25-year latency period; vinyl chloride has a 20-year
latency period). See generally Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A
Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 921-22 (1981) (comments on latency phenomena
in toxic and hazardous exposure cases); Trauberman, supra note 19, at 180 (latency period
between exposure and manifestation of cancer may range between 5 and 40 years).
145. Some continue to subscribe to the notion that the migration patterns of hazardous
wastes are fraught with scientific uncertainty in terms of the direction of the flow and its
velocity. See Johnson v. Tipton, 103 Ill. App. 3d 291, 431 N.E.2d 464, 470 (1982). This
uncertainty can frustrate the injured party's ability to meet the conventional burden of estab-
lishing the requisite causal connection.
146. Asbestos is a prime example. Although scientists were fairly certain of the causal
connection between the inhalation of asbestos and the contracting of cancer (mesotheloma) or
asbestosis, scientists were less certain about the effects of the ingestion of asbestos on human
health. See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 510-14 (8th Cir. 1975).
147. See Trauberman, supra note 19, at 197-201; Comment, Acid Rain-The Limitations of




How are these unique aspects of toxic tort litigation incongruous with
common law causation principles? The answer is almost transparent. First,
the plaintiff has the burden of proof on the issue of causation.' 48 Once
again, to meet this burden, the injured party must establish by the prepon-
derance of the evidence, which is a probability in excess of fifty percent, that
but for the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff would not have been injured or
that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the
plaintiff's injury. 149 In toxic tort litigation the plaintiff will have a difficult,
if not impossible, task in establishing specific causation by the preponder-
ance of the evidence because of the long lapse of time usually involved, the
practical difficulty of pinpointing the specific source of the contamination,
and the arduous task of identifying the responsible party.
150
C. Possible Alternatives to the Traditional Approach to Causation in Toxic
Tort Litigation
Traditional causation principles such as the specific causation require-
ment, the preponderance rule, the "but for" test, and the "substantial fac-
tor" test are generally unsuitable for toxic tort litigation for the various
reasons discussed above.15' The formulation of alternative causation theo-
ries that are consonant with toxic tort thus is necessary to ensure that meri-
torious claims do not go uncompensated or undercompensated and, more'
significantly, that tort law remains a ready source of compensation for the
innocent exposure victim, a means of deterring the culpable party, and a
vehicle for achieving some semblance of corrective justice between the par-
ties. 152 Therefore, a discussion of alternate theories to and possible modifi-
cations of conventional causation principles dominates the next few sections
of this Article.
A cardinal tenet of traditional common law torts is that the plaintiff must
prove that the defendant is responsible for the plaintiff's harm. 153 This prin-
ciple does not generally present any insurmountable problems to the plaintiff
148. Causation, as used in this Article, is causation-in-fact, occasionally alluded to as sim-
ple causation, which relates to the factual relationship between cause and effect. Although
some policy considerations enter into this determination, see Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80,
199 P.2d 1, 5 (1948), causation-in-fact should not be confused with the exclusively policy-laden
concept of proximate cause. See Malone, supra note 14, at 97. The "substantial factor" con-
cept affords a court flexibility to make policy determinations under the guise of causation-in-
fact. Id. at 89.
149. Courts appear to favor the substantial factor test. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 41, at
267-68.
150. The problems attendant to establishing causation in toxic tort litigation exist for a
variety of reasons in addition to latency. For other scientific problems that may forestall re-
covery see Keller, supra note 140, at 53.
151. For an in-depth treatment of inutility of traditional causation concepts in the field of
toxic torts see Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 855-59.
152. Compensation, deterrence, and corrective justice lie at the very heart of tort policy.
See supra text accompanying note 8.
153. Schwartz & Means, The Need for Federal Product Liability and Toxic Tort Legisla-
tion: A Current Assessment, 28 VILL. L. REv. 1088, 1104 (1982-1983). The underlying ratio-
nale for making specific causation a sine qua non to recovery is that, as a matter ofjustice, only
the defendant who actually caused the damage should have to provide recompense.
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in a typical, sporadic accident situation. 54 In the case of a toxic tort, how-
ever, in which identifying the toxic substance or hazardous waste that
caused the exposure injury and the responsible party is difficult, the relent-
less quest for particularistic evidence' 5 5 of specific causation simply tends to
obliterate the plaintiff's chances of recovery. 156
Given this unpleasant prospect, serious consideration has been given to
devising possible exceptions to the rule of imposing liability only on the per-
son responsible for the harm. 157 Developing exceptions to the requirement
of specific causation has been justified mainly on the basis that requiring the
innocent exposure victim to bear the entire loss simply because he or she
cannot meet the arduous, if not impossible, task of establishing the specific
cause of his or her toxic injuries is contrary to public policy. 158 The neces-
sity of producing vast amounts of sophisticated statistical data correlating
certain diseases and environmental exposures 59 makes the requirement of
demonstrating specific causation even more strenuous. Thus, the dispositive
issue centers fittingly upon how to assuage the causation problems in toxic
tort litigation presented by an unswerving adherence to the rule of specific
causation. ' 60 To date, the response to this challenge has more often than not
entailed the creation of some mechanism to ease the plaintiff's burden, most
commonly the shifting of the burden to the shoulders of the defendant.' 6'
The resolution of the causation problem thus has simply been accomplished
154. Generally, the plaintiff can readily identify the responsible tortfeasor and discern the
instrumentality causing the injury. Moreover, a close temporal relationship ordinarily exists
between the act of the defendant and the resulting injury to the plaintiff. One commentator,
however, has questioned the accuracy and fairness of the causation determination in these tort
cases under the preponderance of the evidence rule. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 855-59.
155. Particularistic evidence is direct, nonstatistical evidence of the causal connection. Id.
at 857, 869. This evidence generally is preferable to statistical or probabilistic evidence even
though close reflection reveals that a high degree of probability inheres to particularistic evi-
dence. As some have astutely noted, direct eye-witness evidence is perhaps more inherently
suspect than circumstantial evidence. See PROSSER, supra note 16, § 39, at 243.
156. Schwartz & Means, supra note 153, at 1100-01; see also Zazzali & Grad, supra note 4,
at 457 (proof of causation is major recurring issue).
157. Schwartz & Means, supra note 153, at 1101.
158. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 928-29, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 136-37 cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d
1, 4 (1948). But see Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Mo. 1984) (court rejected
policy argument that innocent plaintiff should recover even if defendant who caused the harm
not specifically identified; court noted that not all deserving plaintiffs are assured of winning in
the tort system).
159. Zazzali & Grad, supra note 4, at 457-58.
160. Id. at 458. "[P]roof of the causal connection between exposure and injury is an almost
overwhelming barrier to recovery, particularly in smaller cases (regardless of their merit) be-
cause the cost of mounting the massive probative effort and the arrays of technical and scien-
tific evidence will be prohibitive." Id.
161. The effect of this shift in responsibility is that the causation burden of proof is as
difficult for the defendant to meet as for the plaintiff, so the plaintiff's chances of recovery
increase when the burden shifts to the defendant. "Defendants will be faced with the same
difficulties of proof that would have barred the plaintiff's recovery had the theory of joint
liability not been applied to assist his case." Note, Causation, supra note 38, at 677 (emphasis
in original); see also Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 856 n.28 (defendants have no better informa-
tion than plaintiffs on issue of specific causation).
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by placing the defendant in the uncomfortable shoes once worn exclusively
by the plaintiff.
1. Alternative Liability
One noteworthy exception to the specific causation rule is the principle of
alternative liability that seminally arose out of Summers v. Tice, 162 a case
with a very intriguing fact pattern. The plaintiff was shot in the eye by
someone firing a gun. The two defendants had negligently discharged their
guns in the plaintiff's vicinity. The plaintiff, however, could not identify
which of the two defendants actually shot him. The court, while clearly
seeking to mete out some form of corrective justice in view of the consequent
proof dilemma that faced the plaintiff, ruled that the burden of proof as to
causation was shifted to the defendants to establish that they did nothing to
cause the plaintiff's injury.163 Furthermore, the court shifted the burden of
apportioning damages to the defendants. 164 These shifts dramatically re-
duced the plaintiff's burden of establishing the defendants' liability by sim-
ply placing the defendants in the same difficult position that the plaintiff
would otherwise have occupied. The court was willing to advance its policy
objectives in this extraordinary manner because fault clearly existed on the
part of both defendants, and alternative liability would, therefore, not do
violence to the interests of either. 165 Moreover, the court's action simply
expressed the basic principle that tort liability should fall on the party most
likely to have done the harm as opposed to the purely innocent one.
In its application to the field of toxic torts the alternative liability theory is
naturally appealing because of the ameliorative effect it has upon the plain-
tiff's causation burden. The exposure victim's likelihood of recovering from
a culpable defendant is markedly enhanced when the defendant carries the
causation onus. 166 Limitations as to the application of the alternative theory
serve to diminish its attractiveness, however. Courts are generally loath to
adopt this exception to specific causation in cases involving no clear indica-
tion that all the defendants are at fault; 167 moreover, courts are naturally
162. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); see Phillips, The Proposed Federal Product Liability
Statute from the Toxic Tort Plaintiff's Perspective, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1156, 1174 (1982-1983)
(discussing effects of the proposed Uniform Products Liability Act on alternative liability the-
ory). The bill, however, failed to get out of the Senate Commerce Committee on May 16,
1985. Product Liability Bill Fails in Senate Committee, in BNA CIVIL TRIAL MANUAL 244
(1985) [hereinafter cited as Product Liability Bill Fails].
163. 199 P.2d at 5.
164. Traditional tort concepts impose both the burdens of proof of causation and appor-
tionment, which the plaintiff must establish by the preponderance of the evidence, upon the
plaintiff. In Summers, however, the defendants had access to evidence and were in a better
position to establish what happened. Kircher, Federal Product Legislation and Toxic Torts:
The Defense Perspective, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1116, 1126 (1982-1983).
165. See PROSSER, supra note 16, § 41, at 271. The author suggests that imposing alterna-
tive liability in an instance of an innocent defendant would cause an injustice. Id.
166. The alternative liability theory will not assure the exposure victim of recovery in every
case because of the possibility, however remote, that a defendant could exonerate himself or
herself by showing that he or she did not cause the plaintiff's injury. Realistically, however,
the odds of this eventuality are slim. See Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 856 n.28.
167. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 41, at 271.
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disinclined to embrace the alternative liability theory when all possible de-
fendants are not before the court. 168 In both instances, the courts' reluc-
tance is probably attributable to a fear of deviating too far from the norm
that a court cannot hold a defendant legally responsible for a plaintiff's
harm without some causal relationship between the defendant's tortious con-
duct and the plaintiff's harm. 169 To be sure, the prospect of contravening
this principle may be unacceptably high when a defendant may not be at
fault, but simply cannot prove it, or when an alleged tortfeasor may not be
before the court with the opportunity to exonerate himself or herself. 170 In
many toxic substance or hazardous waste exposure situations, all defendants
frequently may not be at fault or may not be present, and courts may conse-
quently rebuff the alternative liability theory. 17 1 This rebuff may very well
foreclose an indispensable means of recovery for a toxic tort victim.
2. Concert of Action Theory
While the alternative liability theory may fall short of its desired goals in
certain limited circumstances, another theory, the concert of action the-
ory,1 72 may supplement alternative liability quite well. In fact, one writer
has boldly postulated, "[d]efendants in environmental cases will be the next
target of 'concert of action.' ",173
Probably the paradigmatic case employing the concert of action theory to
overcome the type of causation problem generally prevalent in toxic tort
litigation, identifying the responsible defendant, is Bichler v. Eli Lilly &
Co. 174 In Bichler the focal point of the lawsuit was whether Eli Lilly could
be held responsible to the plaintiff for cancer she allegedly developed as a
result of her mother's consumption of DES, a drug manufactured and dis-
tributed by Eli Lilly and numerous other companies as a prophylactic to
miscarriages and other pregnancy problems.' 75 The complex problem con-
fronting the plaintiff was the virtual impossibility of demonstrating that Eli
Lilly manufactured the DES that her mother had ingested. This problem
would undoubtedly have been a fatal shortcoming under the specific causa-
168. This joinder limitation has been impressed on the alternative liability rule. See Namm
v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 31-32, 427 A.2d 1121, 1127-28 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1981); Zazzali & Grad, supra note 4, at 456 n.55.
169. Kircher, supra note 164, at 1119.
170. Moreover, a corresponding risk exists that the party who actually caused the injury
may not be a party to the proceedings if all defendants are not before the court, which may
work an injustice upon the party defendants.
171. An inherent problem of toxic tort litigation is the identification of the responsible
parties. Given this difficulty, the limitations to alternative liability probably could not be over-
come in many cases.
172. The concert of action theory has its genesis in the venerable common law rule that, if
two or more defendants act pursuant to a common design, each of them is entirely liable for
the tort actually committed by another. In theory, only one tort occurs, and that tort is
chargeable to each member of the concerted action. See PROSSER, supra note 16, § 46, at 323.
173. Appleson, Concert of Action Theory: Polluters Beware, 68 A.B.A. J. 1209, 1209
(1982).
174. 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982).
175. Appleson, supra note 173, at 1209.
[Vol. 40
TOXIC TORT LITIGATION
tion rationale, 176 but the court developed an innovative alternative under the
rubric of concert of action to ease the causation burden. The court charac-
terized the conduct of the DES manufacturers as "conscious parallelism, 1' 77
a type of concerted action that resulted in making any of the manufacturers
liable for the plaintiff's entire damages despite the plaintiff's inability to
identify the manufacturer of the drug taken by her mother. 178 Consistent
with the original common law understanding of joint tortfeasor liability, the
plaintiff was able to select any participant in the concerted activity and sue
and recover without identifying the actual responsible party.
Applying the concerted activity theory specifically to the realm of envi-
ronmental torts indubitably has a tremendous appeal to an exposure vic-
tim. 179 The concerted activity theory finesses the problem of the
unidentifiable defendant. Critics have contended, however, that this device
unduly undermines traditional tort principles and unwisely eviscerates the
concept of causation from tort liability. '8 0
3. Market Share Theory
The policy underpinnings for the concert of action exception to the spe-
cific causation rule similarly undergird the market share theory. Namely,
when the ability to identify the party responsible for the exposure has been
significantly eroded by a protracted latency period or the generic resem-
blance of a product manufactured by a number of different entities, a court,
facing a choice between denying compensation to a victim and imposing lia-
bility on a company that may not have caused the harm, should allow the
injured party to recover.' 8 1 Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories 182 was the semi-
nal case utilizing the market share approach to accomplish this policy objec-
tive without requiring the plaintiff to establish the specific identity of the
manufacturer of the DES that was actually ingested.
The difficulty that the plaintiff experienced in Sindell was strikingly simi-
lar to that experienced by the plaintiff in Bichler. The Sindell court, however,
adopted a different tack to accomplish the desired result of providing com-
pensation to the injured party. The Sindell court held that if the plaintiff
176. See Phillips, supra note 162, at 1173. The author theorizes that "liability only on the
basis of actual cause ... would require identification of the particular defendant." Id.
177. 55 N.Y.2d at 585, 436 N.E.2d at 188, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 782. Conscious parallelism has
been defined as "acting the same way, pursuing the same goal." Appleson, supra note 173, at
1209.
178. Kircher, supra note 164, at 1124. The "drug companies had acted independently of
each other in failing to do such testing, but ... such independent actions had the effect of
substantially aiding or encouraging the failure to test by the others." Id. at 1174 n. 100.
179. The lawyer who successfully handled the Bichler case for the plaintiff has character-
ized the possible effect of the application of the decision to toxic tort litigation as follows: "The
potential, my friends, is enormous." Appleson, supra note 173, at 1209.
180. Kircher, supra note 164, at 1124. "In their desire to fashion a solution to the identifi-
cation problem facing toxic tort plaintiffs, courts have been rather creative in stretching the
boundaries of tort law far beyond intended or logical limits." Id.
181. Schwartz & Means, supra note 153, at 1103-04.
182. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
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were successful in joining a substantial share of the DES manufacturers, 183
then the burden would shift to each defendant to show that it had not done
anything to cause the plaintiff's injuries. 184 Each defendant that failed to
exonerate itself faced liability on the basis of its proportionate share of the
DES market;185 thus, the court dispensed with the requirement of establish-
ing which manufacturer specifically caused the plaintiff's harm.
Applying the market share analysis to toxic tort litigation leaves mixed
feelings. That it may facilitate the plaintiff's causation burden in an other-
wise impossible situation is clear. Dispensing with the specific causation
requirement when the injured party simply joins a substantial share of the
polluters would be a significant development in the area of environmental
tort liability. The likelihood, to be sure, of a polluter's disproving the causal
relationship between its conduct and the plaintiff's injury is virtually nil.
Some pundits have questioned the market share theory, however, stating
that it in essence permits " 'Peter to be blamed for the harm caused by
Paul'."' 186 As a consequence, the argument continues, the market share the-
ory tends to undermine severely the reasonable expectations of the defend-
ants as to the extent of liability they will suffer for their conduct. 187 On the
other hand, market share liability appears to be a sound expression of public
policy. First, the innocent plaintiff who is uncertain about the party respon-
sible for inflicting injury is not absolutely foreclosed from recovery. Second,
the threat of market share liability can serve to deter a defendant from fail-
ing to exercise due care.' 88 Third, liability only attaches in proportion to
each firm's risk contribution. 89  This same argument applies with equal
force to imposing market share liability upon those who commit environ-
mental torts. 190 Thus, the market share theory of Sindell, as well as the
183. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The exact meaning of
"substantial share" remains unclear, which affects the impact of the Sindell decision. But see
Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 672, 684, 710 P.2d 247, 255, 221 Cal. Rptr.
447, 455 (1985) (drug manufacturer that sold 10% of DES nationwide did not have "substan-
tial" share of market that would shift burden of proof on issue of causation to defendant). By
joining a substantial share of the defendants in the lawsuit, the plaintiff theoretically enhances
the probability that one of the joined manufacturers did in fact manufacture the DES that
caused the plaintiff's injuries. In Murphy the court noted that the requisite level of probability
was absent, stating that: "there is only a 10 percent chance that it produced the drug causing
plaintiff's injuries, and a 90 percent chance that another manufacturer was the producer." Id.
184. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
185. The plaintiff presumably could only recover up to the total percentage of the defend-
ants joined in the action. For example, if 90% of the manufacturers were joined, then only
that percentage of the damages could be recovered. What happens in regard to the other 10%
of the market and, hence, to the damages is unknown. In Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 104
Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984), the court expressed strong apprehension that the market
share concept announced in Sindell would lead to assignment of the unaccounted 10% to the
parties before the court. 689 P.2d at 381.
186. Schwartz & Means, supra note 153, at 1104 n.70.
187. Id. at 1104; see also Sheffield v. Eli Lilly & Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 583, 192 Cal. Rptr.
870 (1983), cited in Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 868 n.70 (court refused to apply the market
share theory).
188. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 868.
189. Id.
190. See id. The author notes that courts have limited market share liability to generic
products uniformly marketed by two or more manufacturers, but he states emphatically that
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concert of action theory of Bichler, appear to be ripe for constructive utiliza-
tion in toxic tort litigation. 19'
4. Last Injurious Exposure Rule
In the category of toxic torts involving harmful occupational exposures to
toxic substances or hazardous wastes 192 an innovative concept, the last inju-
rious exposure rule, has been employed in workers' compensation cases to
circumvent the difficulties present when a plaintiff is unsure of the exact
cause of the disease. 193 This rule imposes liability on an employer when the
plaintiff was last exposed to a hazardous material, bearing a causal relation
to the plaintiff's disability, during employment. 194 The principle is not one
based on greater probability, 95 but is actually a rule of convenience.' 96
Consequently, as a matter of policy, this rule effectively serves to lessen, if
not efface, the plaintiff's burden of proving legal causation. 97
Although the last injurious exposure exception has augmented the plain-
tiff's chances of recovery in occupational asbestos exposure cases, some pol-
icy considerations augur against its general utility. For example, a very
significant risk exists that the rule can work to the disadvantage of an em-
ployer who was the injured employee's last employer, but for whom the em-
ployee worked only a relatively short period of time. Absent prescribed
minimum lengths of time for employment, a palpably inequitable result can
ensue in the case of the last, but short-term, employer.' 98 Given this risk,
some jurisdictions have implemented measures designed to protect an em-
ployer from being unfairly subjected to liability. Among these measures are
statutory provisions establishing a minimum period of employment before
this limitation is not justified. The author provides the proper standard for ascertaining the
propriety of applying market share analysis: "As long as liability is aligned with each firm's
risk contribution, it is entirely appropriate for courts to apply the market share approach to
apportion liability among manufacturer$ of variably defective and even different products."
Id.
191. But see Epstein, supra note 94, at 1378-82 (points out fallacious nature of market
share theory as now applied to tort law).
192. The primary types of toxic or hazardous exposures are occupational, environmental,
and consumer product. Schwartz & Means, supra note 153, at 1094. The majority of claims
have their genesis in an occupational setting. Id. Thus, "[w]orker's compensation ... is, at
present, the form of administrative remedy most often relied upon in cases of toxic substance
poisoning." Soble, A Proposal for the Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Sub-
stance Pollution: A Model Act, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 683, 714-15 (1977) (footnote omitted).
193. Note, supra note 24, at 1308.
194. Id. at 1309.
195. The factual circumstances underlying the application of the last injurious exposure
rule do not meet either the "but for" or "substantial factor" tests for causation-in-fact. At
best, the evidence simply establishes a causal link, falling short of the requirements for the
concept of legal causation-in-fact. See Calabresi, supra note 14, at 72.
196. See Ringeisen v. Insulation Servs., Inc., 539 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
197. Note, supra note 24, at 1310. This substitute for specific causation ostensibly furthers
the policy of enhancing the remedial goal of workers' compensation systems, that employees
should recover for those injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. To this end,
the last injurious exposure rule virtually obviates the plaintiff's burden of showing a causal
connection between the work and the injury. Id.
198. See Mathis v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 10 Or. App. 139, 499 P.2d 1331, 1336 (1972).
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liability can be imposed upon an employer1 99 or permitting employers to
require medical examinations for potential employees, thus increasing the
likelihood of screening out those prospective employees who already have
disabling workplace-related illnesses. 2°°
The last injurious exposure rule is limited to a special disease (asbestos-
related ailments), a special place (the occupational environment), and a spe-
cial forum (workers' compensation). This combination of factors probably
accounts for the courts' willingness to adopt an extremely ersatz rule of cau-
sation. Even in this narrow context, however, courts and lawmakers have
carved out limitations to avoid imposing unfair liability upon an employer,
indicating the uneasiness associated with this substitute for specific causa-
tion. Thus, one cannot reasonably conceive of the last injurious exposure
rule, or a variant thereof, being transferred to other areas of toxic or hazard-
ous exposure, such as environmental or consumer product cases. The last
injurious exposure rule seems factually ill-suited for enviromental or con-
sumer product cases, and more importantly, policy considerations seem to
militate against its application. The need to protect the defendant from un-
warranted liability in instances of environmental exposure or consumer
product exposure resulting from the invocation of the last injurious exposure
rule probably overshadows the interest in allowing an innocent plaintiff to
recover.20' Thus, the rule has little utility in environmental or consumer
product exposure areas and courts have accordingly restricted its application
to a small sphere of toxic tort litigation.
5. Enterprise Liability Theory
Courts have occasionally used the novel approach of enterprise liability in
an effort to help plaintiffs meet the causation burden of proof.20 2 The pio-
neer case in this area is Hall v. E.. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.20 3 In Hall
some exploding blasting caps injured the plaintiffs, who later sued several
199. IDAHO CODE § 72-439 (1973) (60 days); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-33(a) (Burns
1974) (60 days in asbestos exposure cases); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1401(g) (Purdon Supp.
1986) (6 months).
200. Note, supra note 24, at 1309.
201. A strong policy favors the compensation of employees for work-related injuries. In
support of this policy, states have enacted workers' compensation laws that generally dispense
with the requirement of proving fault and disallow the defenses of assumption of the risk,
contributory negligence, and the fellow servant rule. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 114, § 4.50(1985). Moreover, causation requirements have traditionally been relaxed in the workers'
compensation area. See R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON TORTS 918 (4th ed. 1984). Add to this the fact that courts are now very aware of the
health and environmental risks of asbestos within the narrow confines of the workplace, and
the reason why courts have liberally applied the last injurious exposure to work-related asbes-
tos injuries becomes evident. That the rule will likely be restricted to this factual context,
however, is equally apparent.
202. The Federal Product Liability Act, proposed by Senator Kasten, may adversely affect
the concept of enterprise liability. Phillips, supra note 162, at 1173. For the time being, how-
ever, this concern is moot because Senator Kasten's bill failed to get out of the Senate Com-
merce Committee, on a tie vote, in May 1985. Product Liability Bill Fails, supra note 162, at
244.
203. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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manufacturers of the blasting caps. The plaintiffs faced a dilemma common
in cases of this nature: they could not identify the manufacturer of the blast-
ing caps that actually caused them harm. As a consequence, the plaintiffs
sued a limited number of defendants who manufactured blasting caps under
"substantially similar industry-imposed safety standards. ' '2° 4
Under the enterprise liability theory espoused in Hall, the industry-wide
standard caused the injury, so that each defendant that used the standard
contributed to and was liable for the plaintiff's injury.20 5 Enterprise liability
thus is a hybrid theory combining elements of alternative liability and con-
cert of action.20 6 The court in Hall, however, imposed restraints upon the
enterprise liability theory by ostensibly limiting its application to those situa-
tions not involving a large number of companies in the particular indus-
try.20 7 Hence, one must consider not only the substantive elements of the
enterprise liability theory, 20 8 but also its practical limitations in determining
the full extent of its applicability to the area of toxic tort litigation. To date,
the courts have not specifically embraced enterprise liability in an environ-
mental tort case. In fact, courts have specifically rejected enterprise liability
in DES exposure litigation, primarily because the nature of the DES indus-
try does not lend itself to the imposition of industry-wide, or enterprise,
liability. 20 9
Some indication exists, however, that toxic substance injuries resulting
from exposure to air or water contaminants may invite the application of the
enterprise liability theory. In fact, the court in Hall alluded to this possibil-
ity. 210 The extension of this theory of joint liability to those cases of air or
water pollution involving an industry composed of a small number of units
and pollution that is truly an enterprise risk seems reasonable.2 11 Surely,
industries can most effectively guard against air and water pollution; this is a
compelling reason for applying enterprise liability. 21 2 No court decisions,
however, have unequivocally reached this conclusion. Moreover, whether
Hall, in its present unadulterated state, would apply to enterprise liability in
204. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, 47 (1984) (discussing Hall v.
E. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.).
205. Id.
206. Phillips, supra note 162, at 1173 n.99.
207. 345 F. Supp. at 378; see Note, Causation, supra note 38, at 673. The existence of a
large number of companies undermines the inference that there was industry-wide control of
the risk, the principal basis of the enterprise theory of joint liability.
208. To establish the enterprise liability theory, one must demonstrate that: "(1) plaintiff's
injury is the result of a business generated risk, (2) the risk is best ascertained by the industry
working together or through trade associations, and (3) the risk is best resolved or avoided by
the industry working together." Note, Causation, supra note 38, at 673.
209. See Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, 47 (1984); Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 609, 607 P.2d 924, 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 143, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). The principal basis for rejecting the enterprise liability theory in
Collins and Sindell was that a large number of drug companies composed the DES industry.
Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 47; Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
210. See 345 F. Supp. at 377; Note, Causation, supra note 38, at 674.
211. Acid rain is a type of air pollution that may be within the pale of the enterprise liabil-
ity theory. See Note, Causation, supra note 38, at 673-75.
212. See 345 F. Supp. at 377.
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a water or air pollution context is unclear, notwithstanding suggestive dic-
tum to that effect.2 13 Thus, the law on this point is not as well-stated as Hall
might give one reason to believe. The status of the enterprise liability theory
as a practical alternative to the traditional tort element of causation in fact
remains dubious.
6. The Duration and Intensity Theory
Another ingenious method of imposing liability for toxic exposure injuries
when no proof of legal causation exists is the duration and intensity the-
ory.2 14 The fundamental premise of this theory is that to avoid establishing
specific causation the plaintiff need only show that the "aggravation of the
disease or ... the exposure was of such duration and intensity that it gener-
ally causes the disease in question, even though actual causation or aggrava-
tion cannot be established in the claimant's case."12 15 Clearly, this principle,
which originated in Caudel-Hyatt, Inc. v. Mixon, 216 an asbestos-related
workers' compensation case, spurns the possibility of foreclosing a victim of
an asbestos-related illness from recovering because of inability to meet the
difficult, if not impossible, burden of proving actual causation. Instead, the
plaintiff needs to prove only the duration and intensity of the exposure. 21 7
Misgivings arise as to the effectiveness of the duration and intensity ap-
proach as a palliative to the traditional tort causation rule in the broad spec-
trum of toxic or hazardous exposure cases. The less demanding duration
and intensity test may be palatable in the well-understood area of asbestos-
related maladies. 218 Consequently, courts may be more receptive to assua-
sive devices that circumvent the harsh ramifications of specific causation in
these exposure cases, for more is known about the etiology of asbestos-re-
lated diseases, and correspondingly less has to be shown with respect to cau-
sation to convince a court of the merits of recovery. To the contrary,
scientific uncertainty still pervades most other hazardous waste or toxic sub-
stance exposure injuries. Thus, in these types of toxic torts, courts may re-
ject a lenient approach like the duration and intensity theory.219 Even if
courts do not totally reject this theory, plaintiffs would have a greater bur-
den of proving duration and intensity of exposure than plaintiffs in asbestos
cases.
220
213. Id. Using Hall as authority presents a problem, however, in that the cases that the
Hall court cites to support application of the enterprise liability theory to air and water pollu-
tion are not enterprise liability cases. Note, Causation, supra note 38, at 674.
214. Note, supra note 24, at 1312.
215. Caudle-Hyatt, Inc. v. Mixon, 220 Va. 495, 260 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1979).
216. Id.
217. Note, supra note 24, at 1311.
218. Id. at 1312.
219. Scientific uncertainty about the effects of such hazardous substances as dioxin and
Agent Orange on human health and the environment prevents analysis under the duration and
intensity test of exposures from these substances even though dioxin and Agent Orange have
some well-known reputed effects. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 782
(E.D.N.Y. 1984); U.S. v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870, 885 (E.D. Ark. 1980).




Another alternative to traditional tort causation principles is causation
established on the basis of the proportionality rule, a species of comparative
causation.2 2 1 Under this alternative to specific causation manufacturers or
other generators of toxic substances or hazardous wastes are liable for injury
to the exposure victim in proportion to the damage caused by the tortious
conduct of each.222 The practical utility of the proportionality rule is two-
fold. First, this rule dispenses with the traditional common law rule that
requires the plaintiff to establish causation-in-fact by the preponderance of
the evidence.223 Under the proportional liability rule courts can impose lia-
bility and grant compensation in proportion to the causation probability of
the excess disease risk224 in the affected population. Courts need not con-
sider whether the causation probability is above or below the fifty-percent
threshold or if an individual plaintiff proved a causal connection. 225 Second,
the proportionality rule resolves the causal indeterminacy problem in mass
exposure cases.2 26 Exposure victims can recover for some of their injuries
even though they may not know the substance causing their disease or the
identity of the responsible party.227 Eliminating the preponderance of the
evidence rule and requirements of specific causation in toxic or hazardous
exposure cases will further the goals of tort law. Allowing a plaintiff to re-
cover without establishing a causal probability in excess of fifty percent,
while, at the same time, not having to offer particularized proof of causation
removes a formidable barrier to recovery. In so doing, the proportionality
rule advances the traditional tort law goals of compensation, deterrence, and
corrective justice. 228 The proportionality rule may very well be an appropri-
ate response to the causation conundrum. 229 The rule simply revamps cur-
rent tort thinking, and, in so doing, perhaps offers a viable alternative to
spect to duration and intensity in hazardous waste cases, under this theory a plaintiff still must
prove the identity of the party "who disposed of the specific harm-producing chemical." Id.
221. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 866.
222. Id.
223. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 38, at 239. A highly artificial, sometimes unfair, situation
commonly characterized as the all-or-nothing causation rule has developed under the prepon-
derance of the evidence rule. Essentially the plaintiff wins if he demonstrates that the
probability of causation exceeds fifty percent, but loses completely if the probability is fifty
percent or less. This system does not appear to foster accepted tort objectives.
224. Excess disease risk means the "disease incidence attributable to the 'excess risk' cre-
ated by the toxic agent" in question, in contrast "to the 'background risk'-the cumulative risk
attributable to all other factors." Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 857.
225. Id. at 859.
226. Id. at 866.
227. Normally, these are the thorniest problems confronting a toxic or hazardous tort ex-
posure victim. See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
228. See Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 779, 783-91 (1985); see also Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 866 (rule enables system
to achieve optimal deterrence objective). But see Elliott, Why Courts? Comment on Robinson,
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 799, 804-05 (1985) (endorses probabilistic causation approach, but eschews
goal analysis of Robinson in preference for an institutional analysis).
229. See Laub, The Application of Enterprise Liability to Asbestos-Related Litigation, 17
TRIAL 58 (1981); Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 866-68, 881-87.
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abandoning the tort system. 230
& Other Possible Modifications of the Specific Causation Rule
a. Sliding Scale Concept. A few lesser known, but provocative, alterna-
tives have also been advanced to alleviate the harshness of the specific causa-
tion principle. One of these alternatives is the sliding scale concept. Under
this approach, the degree of proof required to establish causation varies with
the risks and benefits of the allegedly harmful activity.231 Thus, if the activ-
ity entails some extraordinarily great risks with concomitantly miniscule so-
cietal benefits, then the burden of proof on the issue of causal connection is
relaxed. 23 2 Conversely, an activity involving highly important social benefits
with correspondingly lower attendant risks will probably result in the impo-
sition of more stringent proof requirements for causation. 233
Although at first blush this sliding scale or risk-benefit theory of causation
seems to present a solution to the causation problem in the field of toxic
torts, serious reflection reveals that the theory is not a solution. The trouble-
some areas include: (1) the inherent difficulty for the courts to make reason-
ably precise determinations of cost-benefit and risk-benefit ratios in
convoluted environmental tort cases, 234 and (2) the propensity of injured
parties to fabricate the degree of the risk involved in an attempt to ensure
that courts will apply a lower burden of proof on causation issues in the
litigation.23 5 This theory undermines the torts process in two significant
aspects: first, the arduous task of precisely measuring and balancing risks
against benefits inherently entails the strong possibility of error by a
court;23 6 second, the injured party's tendency to exaggerate the magnitude of
230. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 928. The possible virtue in overhauling the tort system as
opposed to totally abandoning it is that the tort system is both well-tested and well-proven.
Hence, it "may nevertheless be serviceable for the time being-with the installation of some
modem equipment." Id. at 929. See infra notes 291-92 and accompanying text for a contrary
view.
231. Trauberman, supra note 19, at 225.
232. Id.
233. On its face, the sliding scale or risk-benefit approach to causation seems workable.
For years courts have engaged in some form of risk-benefit analysis to establish negligence
under tort law, see, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947),
or to ascertain whether certain activity constitutes a nuisance, see, e.g., Copart Indus., Inc. v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 41 N.Y.2d 564, 572, 362 N.E.2d 968, 974, 394 N.Y.S.2d 169, 175
(1977) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) ("[n]uisance traditionally requires that, after a balancing of
the risk-utility considerations, the gravity of harm to a plaintiff be found to outweigh the social
usefulness of a defendant's activity"). In nuisance actions this balancing is generally apposite
to the question of whether a use or activity is reasonable, a fundamental question in this area of
tort law. The issue of social utility versus risk likewise arises in the context of injunctive relief
sought in connection with nuisance actions. See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co.,
108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700, 706-08 (1972); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,
224-26, 257 N.E.2d 870, 872-73, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315-17 (1970). These two cases illustrate
the application of risk-benefit analysis in nuisance law. The primary remedial question in both
cases was the propriety of either injunctive relief or damages. In view of the case law, an
activity may be unreasonable for the purpose of awarding damages, although injunctive relief
is not available because of the activity's great social utility.
234. Trauberman, supra note 19, at 225.
235. Id. at 224.
236. In environmental law, for example, in which risk-benefit analysis is commonly used, a
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the particular risk leads to the untenable situation of an innocent party quite
possibly being saddled with a loss that he or she did not cause. This injustice
can easily occur when a court possesses less than the desired level of compe-
tence to perform its task so that exaggerated claims of great risks easily sway
the court, effectively relaxing the plaintiff's burden of proof with respect to
causation. 237 The sliding scale approach to causation is fraught with both
scientific and legal uncertainty. Although the approach works to the advan-
tage of the exposure victim, its advantages are unacceptably low when com-
pared to its possible detriment. 238
b. Inferences and Presumptions. Permissible inferences and presump-
tions, or mandatory inferences, have traditionally been employed to facilitate
the plaintiff's burden of proof in a variety of instances. 239 Between the two,
perhaps presumptions are potentially more useful to the exposure victim in a
toxic tort case. 240 A major complication in toxic tort litigation is establish-
ing the causal connection between hazardous substance exposures and later
manifested injuries. 24 1 Of prime concern is whether a presumption of causa-
tion is an appropriate method of alleviating this problem. Since shifting the
burden of going forward to the defendant, the normal procedural effect of a
presumption, enhances the likelihood of compensation, 242 the toxic tort vic-
tim should welcome presumptions as a valuable tool. Moreover, if this bur-
frequent criticism is the imprecision associated with evaluating the risks and correlative bene-
fits of the environmentally questioned activity. See Risk-Benefit Analysis Is Key Tool in US.
Regulation of Chemicals: EPA Is Divided Over Accuracy of Technique, Washington Post, Jan.
3, 1985, at A-6, col. 1 (EPA concedes that its method of risk assessment is of dubious validity
in some respects regarding toxic substances).
237. Trauberman, supra note 19, at 226. A third concern about the sliding scale approach
is the propriety of increasing the difficulty of recovery for an exposure victim simply because
he or she is harmed by a socially advantageous activity. Id.
238. Perhaps a slightly more feasible, yet somewhat similar, theory for assuaging "the cau-
sation problem is to assess the risk of harm to a group of persons exposed to a chemical and
provide fractional recoveries to the entire group." Id.
239. In the law of torts the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, normally a form of circumstantial
evidence of negligence, gives rise to a permissible inference of negligence in some jurisdictions
or a mandatory inference, presumption, in others. W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 278 (7th ed. 1982). A presumption shifts the burden of
going forward to the defendant, and, in a few jurisdictions, actually shifts the burden of per-
suasion, as well as the burden of going forward, to the defendant. Id.
240. Permissible inferences are simply those inferences that the jury is permitted, but not
required, to draw from a given set of facts. These inferences do not, therefore, shift any burden
to the defendant. In the specific context of toxic tort litigation, with the high level of scientific
uncertainty invariably involved, a mere permissible inference does not greatly enhance the
plaintiff's chances of hurdling the causation barrier. As a practical matter, however, a permis-
sible inference can get the issue of causation to the jury, thus avoiding a directed verdict and,
at least theoretically, augmenting the likelihood of recovery. See PROSSER, supra note 16,
§ 40, at 259. On the other hand, a presumption or mandatory inference has a stronger proce-
dural effect. It normally shifts the burden of going forward to the person against whom it
operates. If the party with the burden of going forward fails to rebut the presumption, that
party generally loses.
241. The tort system thus is inadequate for dealing with mass or toxic exposures. See supra
notes 115-18 and accompanying text. "Our inability to compensate pollution victims lies
mainly within our present tort law system. It was not developed with the aim of providing
compensation for all damages." Note, supra note 7, at 926.
242. T. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 26, at 604.
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den shifting should tend in some way to elevate the credibility of
epidemiological proof in establishing the requisite causal connection in toxic
tort litigation, then, here again, this shift will be an exceedingly significant
development toward securing adequate victim compensation. 243 Specifi-
cally, epidemiological evidence that reflects a rise in the incidence of the
exposure victim's disease in the exposed population at the rate of fifty per-
cent may be sufficient to raise a presumption that the exposure in question
caused the particular victim's disease. This prima facie case of causation
effectively shifts the burden of going forward on the issue to the defendant.
Because, as a practical matter, the causation question is thorny for whoever
shoulders the responsibility, a defendant suddenly saddled with the rebuttal
burden may be unable to meet it. Failing this, the toxic tort victim may
prevail regarding causation on the basis of epidemiological evidence that
heretofore would generally have been patently insufficient. More signifi-
cantly, the exposure victim will avoid the responsibility of establishing spe-
cific causation, the bane of almost every toxic exposure victim seeking
compensation today. 244 The spectre of this eventuality understandably in-
timidates some individuals. 24 5
From a policy perspective the real issue underlying the presump-
tion/causation controversy is the proper allocation of the risk of loss in toxic
tort exposure cases. 246 In view of current social and economic conditions in
243. See id. To date, however, courts have not given epidemiological proof much credence
in the causation issue. See Note, supra note 1, at 584.
[T]he evidence may show a statistical increase in the occurrence of [t]his disease
in a population exposed to the toxic substance. But such evidence says little
about the cause of the plaintiff's particular injury: Unless that statistical in-
crease is greater than 100%, his injury probably was not caused by the exposure,
and he will recover nothing.
Id. at 583-84 (emphasis in original).
244. If the defendant fails to adduce sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of
causation, then, generally, the plaintiff exposure victim has established causation by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. Note, supra note 1, at 584 n.32. Some opposition to using presump-
tions to alleviate the exposure victim's causation burden exists. As one report concluded:
The use of presumptions to aid a plaintiff's proof of causation in toxic expo-
sure cases is highly controversial. Advocates believe presumptions enable claim-
ants to make their case despite the absence of clear medical evidence regarding
the cause of an illness. Opponents believe presumptions should not be employed
when the cause of an illness is medically attributable to more than one source or
is unknown. These positions reflect two very different views toward the role
presumptions should play in a trial. Those favoring presumptions believe they
should be used to resolve doubt in favor of an injured individual. Opponents
believe they should not be used to resolve issues legitimately in doubt but only to
remove barriers created by practical problems of proof such as the excessive cost
of amassing pertinent scientific data.
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, LEGISLATIVE ANALY-
SIS No. 45, Toxic TORTS: PROPOSALS FOR COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF HAZARDOUS SUB-
STANCES 19 (1984).
245. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, supra note 244,
at 19 (argument that courts should not employ presumptions when cause of an illness is attrib-
utable to more than one source or is unknown).
246.
Without presumptions, plaintiffs have an extremely difficult time meeting tradi-
tional requirements of proving that a particular substance was in fact the cause
of the illness. Similarly, however, a defendant will probably be just as unable to
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our society24 7 the policy pendulum should swing in favor of the exposure
victim who is in a less favorable position to protect himself or herself from
the exposure and, moreover, generally possesses fewer resources to bear the
costs of the loss ensuing from the harmful exposure. The use of presump-
tions to assuage the causation problems of an exposure victim will foster the
tort goals of compensation, deterrence, and corrective justice between the
parties.
c. Class Action Mechanism. The scientific, medical, and legal problems
associated with establishing causation in toxic tort litigation pose a major
pragmatic concern for the exposure victim: the astronomical costs that one
must incur simply to litigate the causation question. 248 The prospect of stag-
gering litigation costs, including attorney's fees, may have the untoward ef-
fect of denying many meritorious exposure claims access to the courts on the
basis of sheer economics. 249 The class action mechanism may be an appro-
priate method of making the causation determination in toxic tort cases a
financially feasible undertaking for exposure victims. 2 0 Rather than having
to replicate a number of costly individual determinations of causation, the
class action approach allows the consolidation of a number of generically
related cases, quite possibly resulting in tremendous resource savings. 251
Nevertheless, the apparent attractiveness of the class action apparatus to
ameliorate costs attendant to ligitating the causation question in the field of
toxic torts is not universally accepted. Courts invariably decline to permit
the certification of class actions in mass tort cases. 252 The principal explana-
prove the substance was not the cause, so that overcoming a presumption can be
difficult and can mean the defendant will bear the cost of the inability to prove
causation.
Id. at 20 (emphasis in original).
247. Several social and economic conditions call for a policy tilted in favor of the exposure
victim. First, human exposure to hazardous or toxic wastes is one of the most pressing health
and environmental concerns in society today. Second, making the prospect of liability for
victim compensation more likely is a method for deterring those who might indiscriminately
create hazardous exposure risks by violating waste management laws. Finally, because of a
polluter's ability to externalize costs, pollution is actually an economically efficient activity
without the deterrent effect of granting victim compensation. See Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
248. The number of scientists, epidemiologists, and field and laboratory studies required to
establish causation demonstrate that a vast investment of money, time, and human resources is
generally unavoidable. See SUPERFUND SECTION 301(e) STUDY GROUP, SENATE COMM. ON
ENV'T & PUB. WORKS, INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES-ANALYSIS
AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES, S. REP. No. 12, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
249. As alternatives to the traditional tort system, compensation systems that skirt scien-
tific uncertainty have the potential to be much less expensive, cumbersome, and time-consum-
ing. See Abraham & Merrill, Scientific Uncertainty in the Courts, 2 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 93,
106 (1986). Defendants have a decided advantage in this situation because once they develop
the issue of causation, that evidence can be used in subsequent cases. Redundancy for defen-
dants is, for the most part, economically efficient.
250. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 908. "Class treatment of mass exposure claims would
enable plaintiff attorneys to achieve the same economies of scale that defendants already en-
joy." Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.; see Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 258 (D. Utah 1984). Courts gener-
ally have evinced an aversion to the class action apparatus. See, e.g., Zahn v. International
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tion given for the courts' reluctance is that class actions treat claims in a
mass production manner that fails to recognize differences among claim-
ants. 25 3 This reasoning, however, may be inapposite to the causation issue in
toxic tort cases because particularized evidence with significant probative
value seldom exists in an individual case. 254 The likelihood of a court's not
being appropriately sensitive to the differences in the cases, therefore, is vir-
tually nil because usually no real distinctions exist. The cases are virtually
the same in terms of the difficulty of proving causation. Given the arduous-
ness of establishing causation and the vast expenses associated with the ef-
fort, class actions thus may be an economically prudent way to marshal
scarce resources in an assault upon this problematical aspect of toxic tort
litigation.255
D. The Medical Causation Issue
1. General Discussion of the Salient Aspects of Medical Causation
As one commentator has noted, scientists find identifying the precise
cause of toxic tort injuries extremely difficult. 25 6 In addition to the trouble-
some question of legal causation, one must wrestle with another component
of the causation calculus in toxic tort litigation: the medical causation fac-
tor. Causal uncertainty and indeterminacy greatly undermine the assess-
ments of medical scientists. 257 For this reason, medical causation theory has
drifted from the well-nigh impossible task of establishing causation by direct
evidence to a position that focuses upon risk assessment and probabilities of
causation. 258 Inferences of causation arise from epidemiological or toxico-
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 292-93 (1973) (each member of class must assert a claim for damages
exceeding $10,000); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1969) (same); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318-20 (1950) (if address can be obtained, notice to
absent class members must be sent by first class mail); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d
555, 560-61 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005, 1101-02 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 417 U.S. 156,
175 (1974) (named plaintiffs must pay cost of giving notice to all potential plaintiffs). The
foregoing requirements make some class actions impossible, or at least costly, to maintain.
253. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 909.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 910 n.230. "Given the cost and complexity of the causal connection question
. -a question common to every claim arising from a particular mass exposure-it is doubt-
ful that redundant litigation would be less expensive than convening and supervising the
class." Id.; see also AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH,
supra note 244, at 22 (states should remove procedural barriers preventing multiple plaintiffs
from joining in one suit to enable plaintiffs to share litigation costs). Allowing plaintiffs to join
in a class action could alleviate the most formidable barrier to recovery in toxic tort litigation,
proof of legal causation. G. NOTHSTEIN, TOXIC TORTS: LITIGATION OF HAZARDOUS SUB-
STANCE CASES § 23.07, at 693-94 (1984).
256. Note, supra note 23, at 810. This problem of proving causation stems from a variety
of factors including latent manifestation of injuries, epidemiological uncertainty, and the fre-
quent confluence of multiple causes of injuries. Id. at 810-12.
257. See id. at 821.
258. Id. Courts have used the concept of risk assessment to establish the requisite causal
relation for injunctive relief, even though the risk was remote and uncertain. Reserve Mining
Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 520-24 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F.
Supp. 870, 886-87 (E.D. Ark. 1980). In Vertac Chemical, the court used the risk assessment




logical studies that statistically establish a likely causal relationship between
the exposure and the harm.25 9 Unfortunately, the statistical cause and effect
relationship established by such scientific evidence is uncertain to a degree
generally considered to be unacceptable in the field of legal causation. 26°
2. Melding Legal and Medical Causation
Because the proof of a scientifically valid relationship does not always
meet the legal causation standard, courts may, and sometimes do, reject
proffers of proof consisting of scientific data that may establish medical cau-
sation, but fall short of the standards for legal causation. 261 This disaccord
in the association of science and law prevents plaintiffs from establishing
causation. 262 Perhaps some kind of reform should be instituted to modify
the concept of legal causation to bring it in line with the realities of medical
causation. 263 Specifically, utilizing the scientifically inspired probability of
causation approach to allow plaintiffs to establish legal causation on the ba-
sis of evidence reflecting causation probabilities of fifty percent or less will
greatly enhance the exposure victim's chances of recovery. More impor-
tantly, however, such an approach squarely confronts the reality of the com-
plexity and uncertainty of proof in toxic tort litigation in which the degree of
certainty required under current legal causation principles is virtually impos-
sible to achieve. 264 If scientific, that is, medical, principles of causation are
used to supplement the concept of legal causation, this interrelationship of
law and science will strengthen the exposure victim's ability to establish the
requisite causal relationship between exposure and harmful injury.265 Bridg-
ing the gap between legal causation and medical causation is undeniably a
sound means to smooth the exposure victim's otherwise rocky causation
259. See Note, supra note 23, at 820. "[B]efore risk assessment can be conducted two
critical components must be satisfied. First, the toxicity of the substance must be measured
and, second, the extent of human exposure to the substance must be established." Id. at 817.
260. Id. at 814. "This gap between the medical acceptance of some uncertainty in causa-
tion and legally certain causation is itself a major obstacle to recovery in a hazardous waste
injury suit." Id. at 825. Unlike medical causation, tort law does not countenance causal un-
certainty. The mere possibility of causation is not enough to establish legal causation,
although this possibility may be adequate to establish medical causation. Id. at 821-22. Thus,
"[i]f an expert witness fails to testify to a reasonable medical probability of causation, the
plaintiff will suffer a directed verdict or fail to convince a jury that legal causation exists." Id.
at 832. Reasonable medical probability or certainty is, therefore, coterminous with the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard. McElveen & Eddy, supra note 23, at 47.
261. Note, supra note 23, at 825; see Alvarez v. United States, 495 F. Supp. 1188, 1206 (D.
Colo. 1980); Szczepaniak v. United States, No. 80-990, slip. op. (D. Mass. Mar. 2, 1983);
Caudle-Hyatt, Inc. v. Mixon, 220 Va. 495, 260 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1979).
262. Note, supra note 23, at 825. "[A] gap exists between medical acceptance of causation
and legal acceptance in case law which makes proof of legal causation nearly impossible,
through no fault of the injured party." Id. at 842.
263. Id. at 844 (proposes modification of legal causation concept to align with medical
realities of hazardous waste injuries).
264. See Note, The Burden of Proof, supra note 19, at 207-08.
265. The mere probability of a causal association between the exposure and the injury will
therefore suffice to establish legal causation; this will greatly diminish the onus on the exposure
victim and, as importantly, elevate scientific data to a more respected position in proving cau-
sation in toxic tort litigation.
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road, and thus, it would represent a prudent policy step toward the adequate
compensation of victims of exposure to toxic substances or hazardous
wastes.
E. The Future Interdisciplinary Roles of Law, Medicine, and Science in
Resolving the Toxic Tort Causation Conundrum
Toxic substance and hazardous waste exposure torts present extraordi-
nary scientific, medical, and legal problems. 266 Thus, by force of circum-
stances, society should give serious thought to developing the framework for
an effective interrelationship between law, medicine, and science to address
squarely the causation question in toxic tort litigation. 267 Because toxic tort
litigation is invariably hybrid in nature, 268 any problem-solving forum, be it
judicial, administrative, or legislative implicates a number of perspectives. 269
The formidable challenge is synthesizing the causative concepts of law,
medicine, and science to fashion a workable theory of causation for toxic
tort litigation. Such a theory should vindicate the tort law goals of compen-
sation, deterrence, and corrective justice between the parties.270
The development of a proper theoretical framework to address causation
issues in toxic tort cases is urgent.271 To ameliorate the harshness of the
causation requirement, significant, but not radical, changes must be incorpo-
rated into the proof calculus. In the context of law, medicine, and science,
266. Note, supra note 23, at 797.
267. Ironically, the interrelationship of science and law can further obstruct plaintiffs from
properly establishing causation so as to prevent compensation for injuries from exposure to
hazardous wastes. Id. at 825. The major premise of the commentator's conclusion is that
scientific evidence of causation, grounded invariably upon experimentation, is always vulnera-
ble to conflicting expert testimony and health studies. Moreover, even if scientific evidence
qualifies to establish the requisite "association between exposure and injury ... tort law may
ignore scientific proof if the standards of legal causation are not satisfied." Id.; see also McEI-
veen & Eddy, supra note 23, at 49 (disparity between determinations of medical and legal cause
tends to exacerbate difficulties attendant to establishing causation in toxic tort cases).
268. Garrett, Compensating Victims of Toxic Substances: Issues Concerning Proposed Fed-
eral Legislation, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10172, 10174 (1983). Viewing
medicine as a distinct component of the toxic tort liability equation is perhaps more accurate
because in any area fraught with scientific uncertainty, which, of course, the field of toxic torts
is, the practice of medicine is in many ways an art and not truly a science. See McElveen &
Eddy, supra note 23, at 66. Thus, a multidimensional approach, involving law, medicine, and
science, is required to address adequately the problem of causation.
269. Garrett, supra note 268, at 10174. Some writers have seemingly failed to display the
requisite level of appreciation for scientific and medical influences upon the causation question
in the toxic tort field. See Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 855-59.
270. In view of the unique character of toxic tort litigation, traditional legal causation prin-
ciples, divorced from medical and scientific considerations, are not fully capable of achieving
these objectives.
271.
Probably the most important element in toxic tort cases is causation. Even if
the plaintiff has succeeded in demonstrating that he has been exposed to the
defendant's hazardous substance, he may have considerable difficulty in demon-
strating that this exposure has caused him damage. This requirement accounts
for the lack of successful third-party damage awards in many suits, particularly
personal injury suits.
Gasch & Light, Evolving Legal Remedies for Toxic Torts: An Overview, LEGAL NOTES &
VIEWPOINTS, Aug. 1984, at 1, 21.
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courts must become discriminatingly receptive to epidemiological and other
scientific data in resolving toxic tort claims.272 Currently, however, the atti-
tudes of the judiciary toward statistical evidence may lead to the defeat of
toxic tort claims. 273 Some courts have cast aspersions on this type of evi-
dence by characterizing it as hearsay, thus making it inadmissible. 274 The
bias against statistical evidence arising out of epidemiological studies is mul-
tifaceted. First, because statistics can be manipulated, an aura of uncer-
tainty surrounds the use of epidemiological evidence. 27 5 Second, statistical
evidence emanating from epidemiological studies is by its very nature a pop-
ulation group study and not an individual study. This evidence does not
necessarily shed light upon the cause of an individual's injury. 276 Third,
given that epidemiological proof may establish a statistical causal relation-
ship, courts must still determine whether, within a reasonable medical cer-
tainty, that is, more likely than not, a particular person developed his or her
injury from the source in question. 277 The key to reconciling law, medicine,
and science regarding the causation question is to overcome barriers erected
by these widespread judicial predilections. 278
To accomplish this objective science and law must complement each other
272. Id. Enhanced judicial responsiveness to epidemiological and other scientific evidence,
however, will not necessarily be an Elysium for exposure victims. In a series of cases stemming
from Vietnam veterans' exposure to Agent Orange, a federal district court countenanced the
value of epidemiological evidence, but repeatedly concluded that it did not reflect "that pater-
nal veteran exposure to Agent Orange causes birth defects or miscarriages." In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 603 F. Supp. 239, 246-47 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); see also In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (no data shows causal
connection between exposure to Agent Orange and serious adverse health effects). In this case,
instead of buttressing the position of the plaintiff, the district court appraised the epidemiologi-
cal evidence as plainly indicating that "Agent Orange cannot now be shown to have caused
plaintiffs' numerous illnesses." Id. at 1241. To exacerbate matters, the expert affidavits that
the plaintiffs presented fell far short of counteracting the virtually unswerving epidemiological
proof proffered by the government. For an in-depth evaluation of the weaknesses of the plain-
tiffs' expert and epidemiological cases see id. at 1235-36. The plaintiff's bane is inadequacy of
proof of causation. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1290, 1295
(E.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1285, 1289-90
(E.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267, 1279 (E.D.N.Y.
1985); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 782 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
273. Comment, Epidemiologic Proof of Probability." Implementing the Proportional Recovery
Approach in Toxic Exposure Torts, 89 DICK. L. REV. 233, 242 (1984).
274. Comment, A Private Nuisance Approach to Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 7 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 86, 100 (1980). The argument generally raised against epidemiologic statistical
proof, for example, is that the proof is simply based on probabilities and hence is inherently
imprecise. McElveen & Eddy, supra note 23, at 66. Also, "problems of authenticity and cross-
examination" are present in connection with epidemiological studies. Id. at 59.
275. McElveen & Eddy, supra note 23, at 59. "[S]tatistics may be probative. However,
they can also be manipulated, thereby undermining the probative value and reliability of the
conclusions drawn." Id.
276.. Id. at 60. For a legal system wedded almost inextricably to the concept of specific
causation "the question still remains: did the substance or agent in question cause the disease
in the particular person in whom the legal system is interested?" Id. at 47.
277. Id.
278. "The basic issue is how science and law can effectively interact to provide a sound
basis for a determination of causation .... Barnard, Exposure to Toxic Wastes: Uncertainty,
Science, and the Law 7 (Oct. 19, 1983) (unpublished paper presented at National Legal Center




even though lawyers and scientists view the world from radically different
perspectives. 279 How do we achieve this sorely needed symbiotic relation-
ship between lawyers and scientists? If we are able to achieve some sort of
rapprochement, how do we mold it into a positive force to foster a greater
sense of understanding about the true nature of the problem of establishing
causation in toxic tort litigation? This litany of seemingly complex questions
may have a simple answer: the two groups should simply begin to communi-
cate effectively with each other.280 From these improved lines of communi-
cation a better understanding of the respective disciplines and an enhanced
awareness of the differences and similarities in their analytical approaches
will probably ensue. More importantly, this mutual understanding would
act as a catalyst for the formation of a rational and effective system of regu-
lation and safety management. 28' A palatable compensation process for
toxic substance exposure-related diseases and injuries could also result from
this essential cross-fertilization.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE CAUSATION ISSUE
IN Toxic TORT LITIGATION
That causation presents imposing problems for the traditional common
law tort system is axiomatic. 282 Some commentators advocate an overhaul
of the conventional tort system to deal with this pressing concern,283 but
serious thought should be given to abdicating for the most part the tradi-
tional common law tort litigation model and replacing it with an administra-
tive compensation scheme. 284 Such a change in direction may have an
optimal effect in terms of fostering fairness and economic efficiency in the
allocation of the scarce resources available for the compensation of toxic tort
injuries.
279. Todhunter, Science and Law in Chemical Regulation: Bridging the Chasm 18 (May
15, 1984) (unpublished paper presented at Conference on Hazard Evaluation and Risk Assess-
ment, Society of Toxicologic Pathologists). The commentator theorizes that the dramatic di-
vergence of law and science results from the law being rather static because of adherence to the
concept of stare decisis, while science is more susceptible to "change as we learn and under-
stand more about the natural world." Id. at 1.
280. Id. at 18. A prime illustration of the chaos that can arise in connection with health
and safety regulation when no proper melding of law and science occurs is the field of toxic
and hazardous waste management, which, ironically, is the genesis for many toxic tort suits.
Unfortunately, scientists do not communicate sufficiently with the environmental regulators,
many of whom are lawyers; the result borders on disaster. See Manley, Pragmatic Approach
to Environmental Studies, speech presented at the Environmental Conference, University of
Cincinnati (Apr. 12, 1985).
281. Todhunter, supra note 279, at 18.
282. Note, A Suggested Remedy For Toxic Injury: Class Actions, Epidemiology, and Eco-
nomic Efficiency, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 497, 514-16 (1985).
283. See Trauberman, supra note 19, at 177 (predetermination of problems, apportionment,
class actions, Hazardous Substance Victims' Compensation Fund, elimination of proof for
compensation); Note, supra note 282, at 509 (complete restructure of tort system for compen-
sating hazardous waste injuries).
284. The administrative scheme alternative is not a completely novel idea. For example,
Professor Grad's Superfund Section 301(e) report advocates, among many dramatic proposals,
that hazardous waste exposure victims have available an administrative remedy option (Tier
One). SUPERFUND § 301(e) STUDY GROUP, supra note 248.
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A. Why Not a Judicial Solution?
Probably the best argument against adopting a judicial solution to the cau-
sation puzzle is the judicial litigation model itself. As noted earlier,285 com-
mon law tort rules regarding the establishment of liability, including
causation, developed without the intricacies of toxic tort in mind. Because
of this deficiency, it is virtually impossible to recover for toxic tort inju-
ries.286 Although tinkering with the system may alleviate the problem to
some extent,287 this seems to be an improvident course of action because it
ignores the obvious fact that the crux of the problem will still be extant. The
conventional tort law system has judges and juries who experience great dif-
ficulty in dealing with highly technical scientific and medical issues288 that
invariably are integral components of toxic tort litigation. Furthermore, the
tort system has high transaction costs, most notably for fees to expert wit-
nesses and attorneys. 289 The system also has an inherent propensity to be
slow, cumbersome, and protracted, denying the parties to the litigation a
prompt resolution of their dispute.290
To think that a meaningful solution to the causation problem in toxic tort
litigation can somehow be carved from the conventional tort system, is wish-
ful thinking at best.29I The nuances of the causation element in toxic tort
cases are just too taxing for the common law tort system, even with modifi-
cation. Thus, a carefully crafted administrative compensation scheme is per-
force necessary. 292
285. See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
286. See Note, supra note 282, at 509.
287. See supra notes 162-247 and accompanying text.
288. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
The court, conceding the importance of epidemiological evidence on the causation issue, wres-
tled almost aimlessly with deciding whether epidemiological proof and animal studies estab-
lished the causal linkage between the dioxin exposure of Vietnam veterans and the diseases
they allegedly suffered. See also Todhunter, supra note 279, at 16 (ability of judges and jurors
to understand this information questionable).
289. A complex question like causation-in-fact carries a tremendous price tag to meet the
legal proof requirements. See Note, supra note 282, at 515-16.
290. SUPERFUND SECTION 301(e) STUDY GROUP, supra note 248. The recommendations
of the § 301(e) committee, however, fall short of the desired goal because they propose an
administrative system aimed at supplementing, rather than supplanting, a system of legal
remedies.
291. Actually, an alternative compensation system may protect traditional tort principles.
See Mashaw, supra note 10, at 1393 (problem of establishing causation in toxic torts can be
solved by eliminating tort system).
292. See Bartlett, The Legal Development of a Viable Remedy for Toxic Pollution Victims, 4
Toxic SUBSTANCES J. 277. The commentator makes this observation:
Development of an alternative compensation mechanism other than tradi-
tional tort law has received considerable legislative study and attention. These
studies have been virtually unanimous in concluding that existing statutory and
common law allows for an unsatisfactory remedy for victims exposed to this
type of injury. This is especially true for the smaller type of claims. The fre-
quent backlog of court cases also presents a serious impediment to a satisfactory
compensation scheme.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Trauberman, Toxic Substances and the Chemical Victim,
A.B.A. ENVTL. L. NEWSLETTER, Summer 1983, at 1, 2 (existing legal system not efficient or
effective in handling such claims).
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B. The Proposed Administrative Model
Although this administrative compensation scheme proposal hopes to en-
gender further reflection regarding the troublesome element of causation,
bear in mind that reform simply for the sake of enhancing an exposure vic-
tim's chances of recovery is not universally endorsed. 293 Critics of compen-
sation system reform suggest that such reform is not necessary.294 Such
reasoning seems misguided in view of the widely espoused position that a
noticeable problem with many of the current environmental laws is their
preoccupation with prevention, rather than victim compensation. 295 More-
over, a carefully crafted and well-conceived administrative scheme will not
only provide a reasonable level of compensation for the exposure victim, but
will do so in a shorter period of time, with lower transaction costs, and with
a greater degree of scientific and medical accuracy. 296 Of course, for accep-
tance, an administrative scheme must have beneficial consequences that ex-
tend not only to the injured claimant actually involved in the administrative
process, but to the whole of society as well. The attribute of this administra-
tive compensation scheme that is central to this goal will be its ability to
galvanize toxic and hazardous waste polluters to engage in activities
designed to reduce the risks associated with the generation, transportation,
and disposal of toxic and hazardous wastes. 297
1. The Basic Goals of the Proposed Administrative Model
Any proposed alternative to the traditional common law tort system that
is touted as a more favorable means of handling the countervailing legal,
political, and economic policy concerns in toxic tort litigation can only ac-
quire some semblance of legitimacy by providing palatable accommodation
of these competing interests. 298  An alternative compensation scheme,
whether administrative, judicial, or some combination thereof, must strike a
293. Trauberman, supra note 292, at 1.
294. Id.
295. Comment, supra note 111, at 730. "Legislatures have geared environmental statutes
primarily to enforcement against the chemical industries and have thus provided regulatory
mechanisms at both state and federal levels. These regulatory statutes provide extensive ad-
ministrative remedies to the government, but no compensatory remedies to the injured party."
Id. (footnotes omitted); see Almond Hill School v. Department of Agriculture, 768 F.2d 1030,
1035-37 (9th Cir. 1985) (no private right of action under FIFRA nor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982)).
296. The converse is also true; an ill-advised administrative compensation scheme could
create a situation where the advantages become disadvantages. See Comment, Toxic Torts and
Chapter 11 Reorganization: The Problem of Future Claims, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1369, 1394-95
n.208 (1985) (presents general outline of victim compensation system modeled after
Superfund).
297. See Soble, supra note 192, at 730 (enumerating compensation for injured exposure
victims and risk reduction for the benefit of society as bare minimum objectives of any legiti-
mate alternative administrative compensation scheme).
298. See Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 144, at 933-39 (outline of compensation scheme to
accommodate countervailing legal, political, and economic interests); Prince, Compensation
For Victims of Hazardous Substance Exposure, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 657, 722-31 (1985)
(study does not recommend establishment of compensation fund, but provides provocative
recommendations in case a fund is established in the future; these recommendations appear
compatible with reconciling competing legal, political, and economic concerns); see also Kahn
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proper balance between the legal goals of compensation, deterrence, and cor-
rective justice; the political goals of expedience, negotiation, compromise,
and settlement; and the economic goal of maintenance of viable enterprises,
which are essential to economic growth despite their potentially adverse ef-
fect on the quality of the environment and on environmental exposure
victims.
2. The Administrative Framework for Achieving the Goals
The proposed administrative system for disposing of toxic tort claims
must embody features that promote each of the legal goals of compensation,
deterrence, and corrective justice. 29 9 Central to this objective is the recogni-
tion that an effective compensation scheme must be national in scope, fund-
ing, and direction. The rationale for the requirement of a national scheme is
that the toxic tort conundrum is simply too imposing to be handled on any
smaller scale. 3° ° What configuration should a national administrative com-
pensation scheme take? The system should, of course, provide the most
meaningful form of compensation to toxic tort exposure victims, while si-
multaneously fostering deterrence of purveyors of toxic and hazardous
wastes and bringing about risk reduction in a manner that produces at least
a rough sense of justice and fairness between the polluters and the victims of
pollution. The crucial inquiry for the purpose of this Article, however, is
how one gives substance and flesh to this very skeletal, but essentially correct
answer.
Of primary concern is developing a scheme that guards adequately against
the unsavory situation of denying recovery to an unacceptably large number
of deserving toxic tort claimants because of anachronistic tort principles de-
veloped without the complexities of toxic tort litigation in mind.30 1 On the
other hand, to have any meaningful deterrent, or risk reduction, effect, the
& Anderson, A Ten-Point Proposalfor an Asbestos Superfund, 18 FORUM 395, 402-10 (1982)
(covers contributions, administration, eligibility, and tax considerations).
299. See Trauberman, supra note 19, at 177. The commentator proposes a statutory victim
compensation model that fosters the tort goals of fair compensation, meaningful deterrence,
and corrective justice principally through relaxation of the legal, scientific and economic bur-
dens that normally beset the exposure victim. Id.
300. See Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 144, at 930. An effective solution to the problem of
victim compensation in connection with toxic torts must emanate from the federal level "since
individual states will be reluctant to create a climate hostile to industry by imposing costs not
existing in friendlier jurisdictions." Id. Not only the mammoth nature of the risk, but also
political and economic influences, can stifle constructive action by the states. Hence, the pro-
posed administrative compensation scheme must be a product of federal legislation and have
the imprimatur of the federal government.
301. Comment, Close Encounters, supra note 134, at 854; see Note, supra note 134, at 180-
81; Note, Increased Risk of Cancer as an Actionable Injury, 18 GA. L. REV. 563, 564 (1984);
see also Comment, Agent Orange, supra note 134, at 67-71 (profound proof problems in con-
nection with causation for Vietnam veterans who allegedly suffered injury from exposure to
Agent Orange). For a discussion of the causation problem in connection with Agent Orange in
the litany of Agent Orange cases see supra note 272. Causation is not the only formidable
barrier to recovery by an exposure victim. Traditional tort statutes of limitation provisions
enhance the likelihood that victims of latent injuries will be barred from a legal remedy. Note,
Statutes of Limitations and Pollutant Injuries: The Needfor a Comtemporary Legal Response
to Contemporary Technological Failure, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1525, 1527 (1981).
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system must be grounded upon principles that impose liability only upon
those who are the likely cause of the toxic harm underpinning the tort
claim.30 2 The indiscriminate imposition of liability upon potential polluters
will have an insignificant deterrent effect because it will undermine any in-
centive on their part to engage in any kind of behavioral modification to
reduce the risk; the polluters will sense the futility of trying to insulate them-
selves from broad, open-ended liability. Also, the imposition of virtually un-
limited liability upon polluters could have an untoward effect upon the
economic growth and prosperity of many vital enterprises in the United
States.303
3. Specifics of the Proposed Administrative Plan
The administrative compensation scheme presented here has three princi-
pal objectives in mind: first, to compensate the exposure victim; second, to
force the polluter to engage in behavioral modification ineluctably reducing
the risks attendant to the disposal of toxic or hazardous wastes to a level that
does not pose an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health
or the environment; and third, to provide a causation formula that brings
about these much needed legal and political goals at the lowest possible cost
to the economic viability of enterprises that are vital to the nation's eco-
nomic growth and prosperity. To accomplish these compelling, perhaps
countervailing, objectives, the compensation scheme will be carefully
designed in terms of the rules of liability, allowable damages, and methods of
funding. The causation element of the proposed administrative compensa-
tion scheme is an important feature of the liability component.
a. Rules of Liability (Causation). At the heart of any rational suggestion
for an administrative compensation scheme for toxic injuries is a legitimate
framework for resolving the much discussed question of causation. 3° 4
Although causation-in-fact is basically a factual inquiry, policy impulses do
affect its determination. 30 5 As noted earlier, the foremost policy considera-
tion for modifying traditional common law causation principles has been the
302. Huber, The Bhopalization of US. Tort Law, 2 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 73, 76 (1985); see
also Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 HARV. L. REV. 584, 597-98
(1981) (criticizes lack of deterrence in existing Superfund taxing program).
303. Huber, supra note 302, at 78-79; see also Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic that
Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1155 n.171 (1984) (Manville Corp., Unarco,
and Amatex forced into chapter 11 bankruptcy by huge damage awards and litigation expenses
arising from asbestos cases).
304. A suitable causation component is a sine qua non of an administrative compensation
system to strike a proper balance among the policy goals of compensation, deterrence, and
corrective justice. The very integrity of a compensation system is at risk without a rational
causation element. See Huber, supra note 302, at 81. Congruent with Superfund and notions
of progressiveness, however, the basis of liability under this compensation system will be strict
and, thus, will not hinge upon assignment of blame or fault. See supra notes 13 & 93.
305. See Malone, supra note 14, at 61. "[P]olicy may often be a factor when the issue of
cause-in-fact is presented sharply for decision, much as it is when questions of proximate cause
are before the court." Id. See generally Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607
P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (market share liability); Sum-
mers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289
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desire to ensure that an innocent, unsuspecting victim is not foreclosed from
recovery by intractable, outdated common law evidentiary barriers. 30 6 As a
result of this judicial zeal to provide victim compensation, a system of alter-
native causation has evolved by which the courts have apparently
subordinated the countervailing policy consideration that one should only
suffer liability for those consequences that he or she has actually caused.
307
The relevant issue is whether any of these ameliorative causation devices
should be injected into an administrative determination of a toxic tort claim.
The answer should be a resounding "yes," provided the devices will substan-
tially bridge the gap between legal causation and scientific causation and
thus present a model truly apposite to intricate toxic tort causation
problems. 308 The proposed administrative compensation scheme will at-
tempt to meld legal and scientific principles on the causation issue; more
importantly, it will offer an adjudicative mechanism that will promote intel-
ligent resolution of these issues. This will provide a partial break from the
common law litigation model where scientifically uninformed judges and ju-
rors attempt to decide esoteric causation issues in what may be described as
a game of chance that actually undermines the rights of the parties to a fair
and impartial adjudication of the issues.309
To avoid unenlightened, opaque decision-making in the field of toxic torts,
a capable arbiter is necessary to deal effectively with every complicated ques-
tion; this principle is especially true of the causation issue. 310 To this end, a
N.W.2d 20, 26 (1980) (concert of action); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420
A.2d 1305, 1314 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (alternative liability).
306. See supra notes 151-61 and accompanying text.
307. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1357 (E.D. Tex.
1981) (market share liability applicable to asbestos cases), rev'd on other grounds, 681 F.2d 334
(5th Cir. 1982); Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 374 (E.D.N.Y.
1972) (enterprise theory); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981),
aff'd, 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982) (concert of action the-
ory/DES); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368, 382 (1984) (modi-
fied market share/DES); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, 49 (1984)
(risk contribution theory/DES); see also Note, Pollution Share Liability: A New Remedy for
Plaintiffs Injured by Air Pollutants, 9 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 297 (1984). Pollution share liabil-
ity is similar to market share liability. Pollution share liability shifts the burden of proof of
causation to the defendants. Each defendant who fails to prove that he could not have contrib-
uted to the plaintiff's harm must bear a proportional share of the judgment based on his share
of the pollution. The plaintiff, however, must establish that each defendant was polluting the
air at the time of his or her injury.
308. Note, supra note 282, at 520-21.
309. Note, Scientific Evidence and the Question of Judicial Capacity, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 675, 684 (1984). Juries may not be competent to handle disputes involving complex
issues of scientific fact. Id. Moreover, although judges are in a better position to resolve com-
plex disputes because they are generally better educated than the typical lay juror, "[a] trial
judge's educational advantage does not indicate ... that the judge necessarily possesses the
technical skills necessary to fully comprehend complex scientific evidence." Id. at 685; see also
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (D.C. Cir.) (concern about the incompetence of lay judges
in complex litigation), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Jasanoff & Nelkin, Science, Technol-
ogy and the Limits of Judicial Competence, 68 A.B.A. J. 1094 (1982) (incompetence of the
courts in dealing with scientific and technological problems).
310. See Pierce, Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 917 (1985). The
commentator postulates that tort reform in general is needed and that reform is especially
needed in toxic tort cases because of the difficulty of establishing causation. Specifically, ad-
1986]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
panel of experts in the fields of law, science, and medicine should be commis-
sioned to resolve, among other things, the question of whether there is suffi-
cient evidence of the requisite causal relationship between exposure of the
claimant to a toxic or hazardous substance and the ensuing injury for which
the claimant seeks recovery. 3 1' This panel will be designated as the National
Board for the Investigation and Compensation of Toxic Exposure Injuries
(the Board). It will consist of six members, two lawyers, two scientists, a
medical doctor, and an economist. 3 12 The rationale for placing an econo-
ministrative agencies are best equipped to determine causation, especially in cases of toxic
torts, because of their superior ability to assess liability on the basis of statistical probabilities,
to appraise costs on the basis of market share, and to award damages when the causation
probability is less than 50%, all of which courts are unlikely to do. Id. at 932; see also Huber,
supra note 302, at 79 (courts should defer to experts in regulatory agencies). Courts may use
expert special masters in complex environmental litigation. See Little, Court-Appointed Special
Masters in Complex Environmental Litigation: City of Quincy v. Metropolitan District Com-
mission, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 435-469 (1984); see also Whitney, The Casefor Creating a
Special Environmental Court System, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 485-86 (1973) (acknowl-
edges need for special competence and expertise on part of decisionmakers in environmental
tort cases and suggests system of environmental courts). But see Leventhal, Environmental
Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 549-54 (1974) (role of
scientific experts should be limited to advisors to courts).
An administrative compensation scheme, however, would use special expertise more effi-
ciently than would courts, although admittedly the use of experts can ease some of the cumber-
someness that is characteristic of the judiciary's existing treatment of environmental litigation.
But see Bazelon, Coping With Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
817, 828 (1977) (cautions that scientific advisors may supplant judges). In Judge Bazelon's
view the use of scientific advisors
runs the risk of creating surrogate judges, who would be making all the real
decisions, while ... judges are simply left to wear the black robes. In highly
controversial areas, where the experts disagree, it would be dangerous indeed to
allow one expert with one point of view to have special access to the judge's ear.
Id. This apprehension may have prompted some courts to refrain from hearing cases that
involve complex and technical issues beyond their competency. See Washington v. General
Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 113 (1972); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 503-
04 (1971). Although the concern that expert advisors will somehow preempt judges may have
some merit, in the proposed administrative compensation scheme each member of the expert
panel that will make the critical decisions will possess specialized knowledge, and the likeli-
hood of an uninformed arbiter being neutralized by some highly skilled expert is perhaps nil.
311. See the proposed Product Liability Voluntary Claims and Uniform Standards Act 25
(Staff Working Draft # 1, July 15, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Staff Working Draft #1] (estab-
lishes Health Effects Panel).
This bill was ultimately reported out of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation on August 15, 1986, as The Product Liability Reform Act (S. 2760). Senate
Leader Robert Dole withdrew S. 2760 from further consideration, explaining that the measure
could not pass that year with so little time left in the session. See Senate Kills Products Liabil-
ity, THE WEEK IN CONGRESS, CONG. INDEX (CCH) 2 (Sept. 26, 1986).
312. The proposed composition of the Board mirrors the integral perspectives in a toxic
tort determination. Thus, the confluence of well-informed individuals in the areas of law,
science, medicine, and economics will markedly enhance the likelihood of reaching a sound
policy decision. Staff Working Draft # 1, supra note 311, at 34, on the other hand, charges a
Health Effects Panel with determining causation. Nine members, each of whom is well-quali-
fied and specifically trained in medicine or science, will compose the Health Effects Panel. The
proposed act also designates the method of selection, staffing, compensation, and administra-
tive support of the panel. In the administrative compensation scheme proposed here, the Sec-
retary of Commerce will appoint the members of the Board pursuant to a federal statutory
mandate that they be exceptionally well-qualified to assess the scientific, medical, legal, and
economic issues attendant to the causation question in toxic or hazardous exposure cases.
Consistent with the indispensable requirement that members of the Board be fair and impar-
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mist, a nonscientist, on the Board is to ensure that the economic ramifica-
tions of a cause-in-fact determination are always available to the Board.
This arrangement is consistent with the notion that economic considerations
are generally at the heart of environmental decision-making. 313 To be sure,
profound political and economic factors underlie the toxic tort causation
conundrum. 3 14
Despite the presence of an economist, legal, medical, and scientific per-
spectives will primarily guide the Board. Consequently, the test for causa-
tion that currently predominates the law, that causation must be established
on a more probable than not basis, will be tempered by scientific and medical
notions that just as easily can state causation in terms of scientific
probability. 31 -  Rarely, if ever, can a scientist or medical doctor be abso-
lutely certain; thus, the Board should realize that, in the area of toxic tort
litigation, the causation question is such that a mere scientific probability,
not a greater probability, should be the touchstone for recovery. 316 The
tial, no person will be eligible for selection who is affiliated in any way with a generator, trans-
porter, or disposer of toxic waste. Moreover, this same disqualification will apply to anyone
associated in any capacity with a supplier of toxic products. For the sake of symmetry, any
individual related in any manner to an alleged victim of exposure to toxic wastes or products
would also be barred from selection. Although political considerations may ineluctably play a
role in Board member selection, these considerations should not necessarily taint the selection
process. Thus, extremely able people, regardless of political persuasion, should be able to
carry out their duties in a noble fashion.
To ensure the orderly administration of the Board the Secretary of Commerce should ap-
point an administrator, with impeccable administrative abilities, to handle ministerial duties
such as the filing, docketing, and monitoring of administrative claims and perhaps to head up
the investigation arm of the Board. See Soble, supra note 192, at 753 (commentator delineates
a rough counterpart labelled an "Ombudsman").
313. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps
of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 757 (E.D. Ark. 1971); National Environmental Policy Act § 102,
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982). See generally Haight, Harrison & Nichols, Benefit-Cost Analysis of
Environmental Regulation: Case Studies of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 8 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REV. 395 (1984); Leape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation of Environmental Carcin-
ogens, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 86 (1980); Rodgers, Benefits, Costs and Risks: Oversight of
Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191 (1980) (review of
four legislative models of cost-benefit analysis available to governmental regulatory agencies).
314. See Soble, supra note 192, at 685.
315. See Note, supra note 282, at 516-21. Scientists calculate the likelihood of injury from
exposure to a toxic substance by measuring the severity of exposure, which is measured by the
proximity of the waste or by the degree of direct contact with the waste. These scientific
findings are expressed in terms of probability. Moreover, scientists infer causation from statis-
tical correlations between proximity to hazardous waste and higher rates of disease, illness, or
birth defects. Id.; see also Note, Judicial Attitudes Towards Legal and Scientific Proof of Can-
cer Causation, 3 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 344 (1977) (exhorts courts to be more sensitive to
probability in assessing legal liability for causation of cancer).
316. Comment, supra note 273, at 249. The commentator states:
Courts should require less than the traditional quantum of proof from the plain-
tiff in toxic tort cases. Provided the plaintiff proves the unavailability of other
medical evidence, the court should permit the case to go to trial with statistical
evidence limited to the issue of causation and the issue of causation limited to
the probability alleged in the complaint. Upon sufficient evidence, the plaintiff
should be awarded a recovery proportional to the probability of causation he has
shown.
Id.; see also Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 866 (advances proportionality theory that allows re-
covery regardless of probability of causation or absence of individualized proof of causation).
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Board's ready acceptance of epidemiological proof, toxicological studies,
animal studies, and other scientifically sanctioned evidence to illumine the
causal nexus issue thus is necessary. By no means should the Board's ac-
ceptance of scientific data emasculate the requirement of adequate proof of
causation. Adequate proof of causation remains the cornerstone of this ad-
ministrative compensation proposal, 317 but if the evidence, including scien-
tific evidence, reaches the level of reasonable probability, the requisite causal
relationship for awarding compensation should exist. Although this
probability standard eases the claimant's burden on the causation question,
it does not completely relieve him or her of all responsibility. 31 8 Moreover,
the claimant will present his or her case under the watchful eye of an expert
Board, the majority of whom will understand the complex issues underlying
the causation determination. As a consequence, the claimant's burden may
actually be greater than under traditional common law principles because of
the detached, objective manner in which the Board will likely approach the
issue. This scenario is a far cry that the heartrending reaction that purport-
edly underlies the decisions of lay jurors in many complex tort cases. 319
Moreover, having individuals on the Board who have the requisite legal,
medical, and scientific backgrounds to resolve the causation issues accu-
rately and expeditiously will tend to be economically efficient.
To ensure a reasonable degree of fairness, however, the six-member
Board's decision should be subject to appellate review. A three-member
Toxic Exposure Compensation Commission should conduct the review,
which will be limited in scope. 320 A truncated appellate process ensures the
speedy disposition of the matter and reduces the transaction costs associated
with the prosecution and defense of toxic tort claims. 32 1
317. Aligning the causation element with scientific standards, while accepting scientific evi-
dence to give the causation element substantive content, makes this proof apposite to the toxic
tort causation issue.
318. The claimant must still meet a threshold level of proof, a reasonable probability, to
prevail. Although the level of proof necessary, 50% or less, will vary with the facts, this is by
no means an empty requirement.
319. In tort litigation, lay jurors' verdicts are often very sympathetic toward the injured
plaintiff. Because "damages are not determined by a concrete legislative schedule as under
workers' compensation, but are left to the jury to measure on a case-by-case basis under a
general formula which gives the jury wide discretion and considerable opportunity to apply its
own independent judgment" changing this phenomenon is unlikely. R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY
& H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 201, at 742; see also Abraham & Merrill, supra note 249, at 104
(jurors may ignore legal instructions and make a decision based on sympathy).
320. A limited appellate process assures that claims will be resolved with alacrity. Thus,
the Toxic Exposure Compensation Commission should hear appeals only if a federal, proce-
dural due process, constitutional right is at risk. See Prince, supra note 298, at 728. The Toxic
Exposure Compensation Commission should be made up of three administrative law judges
because the Commission's appellate jurisdiction is circumscribed to this narrow question of
constitutional law.
321. Huber, supra note 302, at 77. The commentator notes:
Furthermore, the new tort system does not serve as an effective tool for com-
pensating victims of public risks. Rather, it is highly capricious, its proceedings
are interminably protracted, and, worst of all, its agents are extremely expen-
sive. For every dollar that-after many years--ends up in the pocket of an
injured plaintiff, several dollars will be diverted to lawyers for the plaintiff and
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b. Allowable Damages. Compelling policy questions surround the issue
of what damages a successful claimant in a toxic tort case should receive.
Should an administrative compensation scheme allow damage awards that
mirror traditional tort remedies or should the permissible compensation
package be streamlined and thus provide compensatory relief that falls short
of a full tort recovery? Policy considerations argue in favor of a combination
of both possibilities.
For example, the full array of traditional tort damages furthers the ever
present tort law goal of providing adequate compensation to the innocent
victim. Within this catalog of damages the most debatable components are
damages for pain and suffering and for loss of future earning capacity. 32 2
Depending on the facts of the case, these components can and often do make
up a substantial part of a personal injury award. Yet, both awards require a
certain amount of "crystal balling" by the jury since they are inherently
speculative and conjectural. The positive advantage of providing an inno-
cent party full recompense for his or her injuries, however, generally over-
shadows the potentially negative features of pain and suffering and lost
earning capacity awards. On the other hand, an administrative compensa-
tion scheme perhaps should eschew damages for pain and suffering and loss
of future earning capacity because they have historically been used to allow
the injured party to pay attorneys' fees and still have adequate compensation
left.3 2 3 Moreover, the impetus for such awards, especially for pain and suf-
fering damages, is frequently the emotional states of mind of jurors. Thus, a
legitimate administrative compensation scheme, the argument goes, should
limit recovery to those damages that can be established with a fair degree of
specificity, that are not too speculative or conjectural, and that are not sus-
ceptible to being a product, in whole or in part, of the passion of a jury.324
defendant and to judges, law clerks, administrative staff, expert witnesses, and
miscellaneous other camp followers.
Id.; see also Kahn & Anderson, supra note 298, at 395-401 (lamenting high transaction costs
attendant to asbestos litigation); Rand Urges Tort Commission, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 1985, at
13 (addresses litany of special problems created by mass tort litigation, including high transac-
tion costs).
322. Although courts have universally permitted tort damages for pain and suffering, some
have advanced scathing assaults upon this practice on the basis that these are noneconomic
losses not precisely measurable in dollars and cents. See Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury.:
The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 224-25 (1953); Peck, Compensa-
tion for Pain: A Reappraisal in Light of New Medical Evidence, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1370-
71 (1974). Such disdainful arguments have fueled similar restrictive thoughts that pain and
suffering damages should not be awarded from a toxic tort administrative compensation fund.
Prince, supra note 298, at 730. Similar policy arguments also militate against awarding dam-
ages for loss of future earning capacity, although such a loss is an economic loss. R. EPSTEIN,
C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, JR., supra note 201, at 742; see also J. HENDERSON & R. PEAR-
SON, THE TORTS PROCESS 198 (2d ed. 1981) (task of placing dollar values on loss of earning
capacity involves guesswork).
323. J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, supra note 322, at 196; W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 239, at 552. The problems attendant to making an exact determination
of these categories of damage also militate against their inclusion in this proposed compensa-
tion scheme.
324. In both workers' compensation and Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012, 2014,
2039, 2073, 2210, 2232, 2239 (1982) administrative compensation systems, for example, gener-
ally established fixed limits on liability exist. See Huber, supra note 302, at 78, 81. Moreover,
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When the issue of punitive damages is injected into the equation, the pol-
icy questions intensify. Punitive damages serve two primary policy objec-
tives: to punish the culpable party and to deter others from engaging in
similar conduct. 325 Some statutory and administrative compensation
schemes expressly preclude punitive damages. 326 Other schemes do not spe-
cifically address the issue, so courts have addressed the question.3 27 Punitive
damage awards that actually punish wrongdoers who act with conscious in-
difference for the safety of others and that deter others from engaging in
similar conduct appear to further important policy objectives. Arguments
against the imposition of such a sanction, however, do exist. The arguments
include: (1) punishment as a basis for action should be restricted to criminal
proceedings and not allowed in civil tort proceedings, and certainly not in
civil administrative proceedings; 328 and (2) punitive damages are simply a
arguments for exclusions of or fixed limits on certain components of damage in toxic tort cases
are given impetus by decisions like Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 399-
406 (5th Cir. 1986) (asbestos exposure case allowing punitive damages, damages for reasonable
probability of getting cancer, and damages for present fear of getting cancer in the future).
325. See Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841, 844 (1954) (punitive damages
awarded as punishment and as warning to others). Other cases also adopted the dual purposes
of punishment and deterrence for awarding punitive damages. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co., 119 Cal. 3d 757, 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 382 (1981); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
U.S. Concrete Pipe Co., 369 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Kelsay v. Motorola,
Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353, 360 (1978).
326. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1982) (United States not liable for
punitive damages); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-14-2 (1982) (provides restitution for crime victims,
but precludes awards for punitive damages, pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of
consortium); see also Note, Defining Punitive Damages Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 53
U. CIN. L. REV. 251 (1984) (problems in defining punitive damages in connection with explicit
limitation in FTCA).
327. See, e.g., Baas v. Hoye, 766 F.2d 1190, 1195 (8th Cir. 1985) (reversed punitive damage
award in suit under Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), which does not
provide for punitive damages award); Hurst v. United States Postal Serv., 491 F. Supp. 870,
873 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1982), does not
allow court to award punitive damages); Woods v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 231 Kan. 763, 648
P.2d 234, 241 (1982) (administrative agency has no power to and may not determine dam-
ages). In Woods the Kansas Supreme Court overturned the Kansas Commission on Civil
Rights' award of damages for pain, suffering, and humiliation because the discrimination act
did not authorize damages for pain, suffering, and humiliation, or punitive damages. Id. For a
discussion of the propriety of punitive damages pursuant to an arbitral decision see Baker v.
Sadick, 162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 626, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 681 (1984) (arbitration panel could
award punitive damages in medical malpractice claims); Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 40
N.Y.2d 354, 356, 353 N.E.2d 793, 794, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831, 832 (1976) (not permissible even if
parties agree to punitive damages); Rodgers Builders, Inc. v. McQueen, 76 N.C. App. 16, 331
S.E.2d 726, 734 (1985) (arbitration of claims for punitive damages does not contravene public
policy); see also Alewine v. City Council, 505 F. Supp. 880, 892 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (under Geor-
gia law punitive damages only recoverable if authorized by statute), rev'd on other grounds, 699
F.2d 1060 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1391, 84 L. Ed. 2d 781 (1985).
328. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 239, at 560. The au-
thors note:
The policy of awarding punitive damages in tort cases has been a subject of
much dispute. It has been condemned as undue compensation to the plaintiff
beyond his just desserts, in the form of a criminal fine which should be paid to
the state, if to anyone, and which is fixed by the caprice of the jury, without any
standards, and without any of the usual safeguards thrown about criminal pro-
cedure, such as proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the privilege against
self-incrimination, and even the rule against double jeopardy-since, except in
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means to ensure the recovery of attorneys' fees under the American rule
while still affording the claimant a full measure of recovery. 329 Even if
either one or both of the foregoing arguments are unfounded, the fact re-
mains that courts impose punitive or exemplary damages on the basis of
evidence that does not approach the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of
the criminal law.330 Furthermore, in an administrative compensation sys-
tem the additional complicating factor of who pays the punitive damage
award from the available source of funds presents other knotty problems.33
Thus, punitive damages will not be available under the proposed scheme.
For the proposed administrative compensation scheme to fulfill its policy
objectives of compensation, deterrence, and corrective justice, the remedial
provisions must be meticulously tailored with these goals in mind. Thus, the
proposed administrative scheme will permit unlimited recovery with respect
to medical expenses, both past and future, and lost wages, both past and
future. The theory underlying this liberal treatment of these two cardinal
elements of damages is simple: these damages lend themselves to a greater
certainty of proof, and the vast majority of toxic tort victims are likely to
suffer these losses. 3
32
On the other hand, an unrestrained remedy for damages for past and fu-
Indiana, the defendant may still be punished for the crime after he has been
mulcted in the tort action.
Id.; see Dorsey, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
8 (1982); Sales, The Emergency of Punitive Damages in Product Liability Actions: A Further
Assault on the Citadel, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351 (1984). At least two states have codified more
definitive guidelines for awarding punitive damages: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West
1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1985).
For a general assessment of the provision of punitive damages from an economic perspective
see Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79 (1982). The author
uses economic analysis to determine when an award of punitive damages is appropriate and
economic theory to compute the size of any punitive damage award.
329. W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 239, at 561. Several judicial
decisions have expressly acknowledged that attorneys' fees may be a part of punitive damage
awards. See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 168, 178-79 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 626
F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Anvil Inv. Ltd. Partnership v. Thornhill Condominiums Ltd., 85
Ill. App. 3d 1108, 407 N.E.2d 645, 654 (1980); Planet Plows, Inc. v. Evans, 600 S.W.2d 874,
877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, no writ).
330. W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 239, at 560.
331. A principal concern is the untoward economic ramifications that the provision of pu-
nitive damages would have on the compensation fund. Certainly, this added financial burden
could jeopardize the reasonableness and fairness of the compensation system's funding appara-
tus. The potentially catastrophic effect of punitive damages awards has attracted the attention
of some courts in the traditional private tort system. See In re Air Crash Disaster, 644 F.2d
594, 632 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981) (punitive damages not allowed so as to
protect defendant from excessive financial liability); see also Note, After the Hyatt Tragedy:
Rethinking Punitive Damages in Mass Disaster Litigation, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 64, 69 (1983)
(plaintiffs face risk that first to sue might receive all limited funds available). These policy
arguments have special relevance to toxic tort litigation. Parnell, Manufacturers of Toxic Sub-
stances: Tort Liability and Punitive Damages, 17 FORUM 947, 966 (1982).
332. Medical expenses "tend to be made up of the most concretely and objectively demon-
strable items advanced by the plaintiff." J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, supra note 322, at
189. Lost wages calculations may be somewhat more difficult, especially in connection with
future wages, which have to be discounted to present value and which possibly raise questions
as to the propriety of an inflation buffer. R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, JR., supra
note 201, at 754-55.
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ture pain and suffering and mental anguish, loss of future earning capacity
from personal injury or wrongful death, and permanent injuries, all of which
are within the realm of the somewhat uncertain and speculative, seems ill-
advised.333 Thus, as to these components of damages, a restrictive schedule
or cap should limit a claimant's recovery. What should these constraints on
recovery be? Should the Board dole out compensation to claimants in gra-
dations up to some maximum ceiling?
The Board should not make these intricate determinations out of whole
cloth. Rather, a legislatively mandated schedule of maximum benefits
should control these types of damages.334 The Board should have discretion
to determine damages falling below the maximum allowable amount, and
should base these awards on the nature and degree of the claimant's injury,
the claimant's occupational and educational background, and, in the case of
wrongful death, the life expectancy of the deceased or surviving spouse or
next of kin, whichever is less.335 In assessing these damages the Board will
act essentially like a jury except that it will have maximum limits beyond
which it cannot tread. 336 This system will serve the interests of the claimant
333. Such damages, if doled out without any limitations, could place undue pressure upon
the financial integrity of the compensation fund. Of course, the elimination of the lay jury
from the process reduces the likelihood of outlandish, deep-pocket claims against the fund.
See Huber, supra note 302, at 81. Similarly, no recovery will be allowed for some of the novel
damage claims currently made in toxic tort litigation: deprivation and denigration of the
quality of life, lifetime medical surveillance, increased risk of future disease, and fear of future
injury. Such damages are too speculative and would probably jeopardize the fiscal integrity of
the compensation fund. For a discussion of these innovative damages see Ayers v. Township
of Jackson, 189 N.J. Super. 561, 461 A.2d 184, 186-90 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 202 N.J. Super. 106, 493 A.2d 1314 (Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. granted,
102 N.J. 306, 508 A.2d 191 (1985).
334. The federal legislation creating the proposed administrative compensation scheme
should embody the schedule of maximum benefits. A prime example of a legislatively imposed
limitation to wrongful death recovery is the Warsaw Convention, which sets a $75,000 cap on
damages in civil international air mishaps. In Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahfoud, 106 S. Ct.
586, 88 L. Ed. 2d 522 (1985) (per curiam), an equally divided Court affirmed a decision of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that trial courts may award both prejudgment and postjudg-
ment interest in addition to $75,000 limit. Although rapidly dwindling and decidedly in the
minority, a few states continue to impose restrictions on recovery of certain damages under
their respective wrongful death statutes. See R. EPSTEIN, C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, JR.,
supra note 201, at 794; see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-203 (1973) ($45,000 limit); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 556.13 (1974) ($50,000 limit); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:31-5 (1968) (dam-
ages awarded with reference to pecuniary injuries plus hospital, medical, and funeral ex-
penses). The medical malpractice area has recently seen legislatively established restraints on
liability. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 145-46, 695 P.2d 665,
679, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 374 (1985) ($250,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical mal-
practice cases constitutional), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 214, 88 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1985); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1979) ($500,000 cap on general damages); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 21-3-11 (1979) ($500,000 cap on general damages); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
581.14 (1983) ($1 million cap upon any recovery). In connection with no-fault automobile
insurance, Florida, for example, restricts the instances when one can recover for pain and
suffering. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737 (West 1982).
335. See 0. HARRIS, ARKANSAS WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS § 10-3 (1984) (citing He-
lena Gas Co. v. Rogers, 104 Ark. 59, 147 S.W. 473, 476 (1912); Fordyce v. McCants, 51 Ark.
509, 11 S.W. 694, 695-96 (1889)).
336. Necessity requires the imposition of maximum limits to recovery to maintain a rea-
sonable level of benefits for injured claimants at affordable costs. Although the proposed ad-
ministrative compensation scheme obviates the specter of heartrending jury awards,
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by granting him the advantages of a deliberative process involving some
measure of discretion; the system will also mollify the defendant polluters by
shielding them from unreasonably large monetary awards based on nebulous
and extremely speculative elements of damage.
In summary, the proposed compensation system will provide a reasonable
level of compensation to the toxic tort exposure victim, limiting the recovery
of only those damages that are inherently speculative and that defy exact
measurement, while still providing a schedule of benefits that ensures more
than just a token award for past and future pain and suffering, mental
anguish, loss of future earning capacity, and permanent injury caused by the
toxic exposure. Moreover, those damages that are readily reducible to a defi-
nite amount, lost wages and medical expenses, are not limited in any fashion.
This mixture of limited and unlimited damage provisions will not only pro-
vide adequate compensation to the exposure victim, but will also bring about
a favorable level of deterrence because of the specter of a sizable, though not
unlimited, administrative recovery. Furthermore, the provisions designed to
keep liability within reasonable bounds will foster justice and fairness for
polluters by shielding them from possible catastrophic liability.
c. Method of Funding. To be a practicable alternative to the traditional
tort liability system an administrative compensation scheme for toxic torts
must receive funding in a manner that fosters solvency, encourages future
research and development, 337 and exacts contributions from polluters in an
amount proportionate to the risk they create. To ensure solvency, eligibility
criteria for funding the compensation program should embrace an extensive
number of generators, transporters, and disposers of toxic substances and
hazardous wastes. 338  With this broad-based support of the compensation
prophylactic measures aimed at fostering fiscal prudence in administering compensation funds
remain vital.
337. In connection with the preeminence of future research and development in toxic tort
policy-making see Abraham & Merrill, supra note 249, at 102. The commentators suggest that
the ultimate allocation of the burden of proof can play a significant role in future research into
ascertainable, but unknown, risks. "[T]he likelihood that uncertainty will be resolved may be
powerfully influenced by the allocation of the burden of proof in tort claims. The party who
loses when uncertainty cannot be resolved has the incentive to discover the information neces-
sary to resolve uncertainty, whether concerning source or biological causation." Id.; see Soble,
supra note 192, at 687.
338. At a bare minimum, all generators, transporters, and disposal facilities, which are
subject to the strictures of RCRA, should have some contribution obligation. Beyond this, the
funding sources should comprise chemical and chemical feedstock producers as well as seg-
ments of the general manufacturing industry. In the Senate's most recent proposed Superfund
bill, for example, the taxing authority extends to the manufacturing industry. Superfund:
Congress has dawdled too long over a hazardous-wastes bill, Cincinnati Enquirer, Nov. 18,
1985, at A-8, col. 1 (impose .08% tax on every step of manufacturing process on all manufac-
turers, regardless of whether they contributed to the waste problem). But see House Passes
Superfund Reauthorization, THE WEEK IN CONGRESS, CONG. INDEX (CCH) (Dec. 13, 1985)
(House of Representatives voted against broad-based manufacturers' excise tax). The House
of Representatives and the administration seemed myopic in not expanding the funding base to
the manufacturing sector. House and Senate conferees, however, subsequently "agreed on a
five-year, $10 billion program of increased Superfund taxes, with a controversial manufactur-
ers excise tax as the linchpin of the taxing scheme." Budget Bill Stalls Adjournment, THE
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pool the likelihood of avoiding some of the funding crises that have plagued
Superfund is evident. Quite frankly, Superfund's dilemma stemmed partially
from the small base of chemical manufacturers that were obligated to con-
tribute to the compensation fund; these manufacturers represented only a
small percentage of those entities that may have contributed directly or indi-
rectly to hazardous waste sites and to the environmental exposure problems
that ensued. 339
Under the proposed administrative compensation scheme the funding
mechanism will implicate all those subject to RCRA as generators, trans-
porters, and disposers of hazardous wastes. 340 In addition, all manufactur-
ers of chemicals and chemical feedstocks will have to contribute to the
compensation fund. 34 1 Although the funding base will broaden, the funding
calculus will promote two objectives central to the overall success of the
administrative scheme: (1) continued research and development concerning
the etiology of toxic-related injuries, and (2) heightened deterrence of actual
and potential offenders. Both should, in turn, have the salutary effect of
overall risk reduction. 342
More precisely, the funding scheme will use a formula that exacts contri-
butions in direct proportion to the gravity of the risk created. If the nature
of the activity is such that the actual and foreseeable risk is extremely high,
then that actor will contribute a correspondingly higher amount to the com-
pensation pool. Conversely, the lower the risk involved, the smaller the ac-
tor's proportionate contribution will be to the fund. 34 3  From a policy
perspective this contribution formula will encourage a polluter to engage in
scientific research to ascertain the nature of the danger, the etiology of the
risk, and the precise paths that a toxic or hazardous substance travels to
reach the exposure victim. Investing assets to study and resolve unknown,
but ascertainable risks should reduce the risks of exposure; 344 consequently,
a concomitant diminution in the amount that such a polluter must contrib-
ute to the compensation fund is only fair. 345 In a similar vein, this contribu-
WEEK IN CONGRESS, CONG. INDEX (CCH) (Dec. 20, 1985). The final version of Superfund
($9 billion) does tax corporate earnings of the manafacturing sector. See supra note 34.
339. See Stephan, Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste: May Companies Be Twice Taxed?, PRE-
VIEW U.S. Sup. CT. DECISIONS, Issue No. 5, Dec. 7, 1985, at 129 ("Superfund is smaller than
was originally proposed ($1.6 billion rather than $4.1 billion) and involves a tax on a smaller
class of taxpayers (less than 1,000 rather than 260,000).").
340. Consistent with the amendatory provisions of § 7003, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982), the
federal imminent hazard action provision, past and present generators, transporters, and own-
ers of or operators of disposal facilities should contribute to the funding scheme. See also id.
§ 6924(u) (further evidence of Congress's intention to broaden the reach of RCRA to past
hazardous waste activities).
341. Congress did expand funding sources for Superfund by including the general manu-
facturing interests. See supra note 34.
342. See Note, supra notes 2, at 862.
343. For a discussion of the sliding scale concept see supra notes 231-38 and accompanying
text.
344. Soble, supra note 192, at 723 (society should focus its creative energies on abating the
unknown, but ascertainable, risks to human health and the environment).
345. See id. at 753. "As an incentive to minimize risk, the levy on toxic substances classi-
fied in the lowest category will always be zero." Id. at 752.
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tion formula should also have a deterrent effect on polluters, for human
behavior normally strives to attain that level of conduct that will mitigate,
not increase, one's liability exposure. 346 Thus, favorable response to risk-
reducing conduct on the part of polluters will further some compelling and
essential policy objectives of the proposed administrative compensation
scheme. Such a response will provide an incentive for industry to engage in
a research and development program on the effects of human exposure to
toxic substances and hazardous wastes and will provide a disincentive for
industry to engage in callous disposal practices that create an unreasonable
risk to human health and the environment.
Not only is developing an administrative compensation scheme that is an
incentive for polluters to reduce the risk of injury to human health and the
environment from toxic substance or hazardous waste exposure necessary,
but ensuring that the costs of funding the system are ratably borne by both
industry and the federal government in a fair and equitable manner is also
vital.347 Consequently, the proposed compensation scheme must be con-
figured to achieve this end. Central to the idea of a scheme jointly funded by
the chemical and waste management industries along with the federal gov-
ernment is the realization that the principal contributors to the hazardous
and toxic substances exposure problem as well as the primary beneficiaries of
any risk-reduction effort should share equitably the financial burden of obvi-
ating or, at least, alleviating the risk.348 The polluter's obligation in this
regard is transparent: if one creates the risk, one must shoulder some re-
sponsibility for eliminating or reducing it. The fairness of requiring the ben-
eficiaries of a risk-reducing administrative compensation program, literally
every man, woman, child, and living organism in our environment, to con-
tribute to a compensation fund by paying taxes to the federal government is
not so readily apparent. After all, this class did not create the risk; in fact,
346. Though human behavior is often unpredictable, the proposed compensation scheme
offers a solid analytical approach to deterrence, or risk reduction.
347. To suggest general revenue as a source of possible funding at a time when the nation is
in the throes of a $200 billion deficit smacks of temerity. Other cost-saving or budget-reduc-
tion measures should make possible the preeminent goals of this proposed compensation plan
without bankrupting the nation. Perhaps the recently enacted Gramm-Rudman budget-bal-
ancing bill, The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-
177, 99 Stat. 1037 (1985), is an appropriate step to this end. See Test Looms on Gramm-
Rudman Constitutionality, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 30, 1985-Jan. 6, 1986, at 5. col. 1 (discussion of
the salient constitutional questions lurking within this dramatic piece of legislation). A three-
judge federal panel struck down, on constitutional grounds, "the triggering mechanism of"
Gramm-Rudman. Stengel, Back to the Future, Again, TIME, Feb. 17, 1986, at 22. "But pend-
ing an appeal to the Supreme Court, its provisions remain in force .. . ." 1d.; see Synar v.
United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1377 (D.D.C. 1986) (delegation to Comptroller General
violates separation of powers principle), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 92
L. Ed. 2d 583 (1986).
348. Cf Futrell, The Environmental Law Institute Study: Statutory Reform of "Toxic
Torts," in HAZARDOUS WASTES, SUPERFUND, AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES, ALI-ABA COURSE
OF STUDY MATERIALS 225, 226 (1985) ("the ELI Study recommends establishment of a com-
pensation scheme financed by a tax on oil and chemical feedstocks for the initial baseline of the
fund. The Study also sets up a system for phasing in a hazard fee to replace eventually the




for the most part, its members are victims of it. So why should these people
be saddled with any responsibility? Perhaps the answer is not too complex.
We are all a part of the same "commons. '349 If any threat to the existence
of any part of the "commons" is diminished in any way and at any time,
then each of us is to some degree a beneficiary. 350 Consequently, we may, as
a matter of fundamental fairness, have to provide some recompense. More-
over, both the chemical industry and the waste management sector provide
products and services of high social utility in which we, the members of
society, again principally benefit.351 Thus, it seems palpably fair and reason-
able that the risk of loss should at least be partially spread throughout soci-
ety by general tax levies as opposed to letting the risk fall solely on the
shoulders of chemical producers and hazardous and toxic waste generators,
transporters, and disposers.352 Congruent with the goal of achieving an eq-
uitable allocation of the risk of loss, the compensation scheme should be
funded in equal amounts by industry, both chemical and waste management,
and the federal government. In addition to being reasonably fair this fund-
ing proposal provides the financial integrity sorely needed to have a viable
compensation scheme. 35 3
V. CONCLUSION
Proving causation is a key ingredient to the successful prosecution of a
toxic tort action for compensation of an exposure victim. Unfortunately,
since the typical toxic tort case involves complex questions of law, science,
medicine, economics, and public or social policy, no simple solution exists
for ameliorating the harsh impact that onerous evidentiary requirements
place on an injured claimant. One thing, however, is reasonably apparent:
349. Hardin, supra note 247, at 1248.
350. Id. According to the commentator, if a threat to the "commons" goes unchecked, the
ineluctable consequence will be utter tragedy and destruction. Conversely, if coercive meas-
ures, such as taxes, are imposed, then unbridled "freedom" to the "commons" is abridged,
averting the tragedy. Ironically, the imposition of this additional tax burden, or any other
coercive device, upon the public can be the salvation of the "commons." Id. Everyone bene-
fits, therefore, by ensuring that "the environment will never again be a 'free good.' " Kean,
The Environmental Movement in 1985: Between NEPA and 2000, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
199, 209 (1985).
351. Some notable examples of highly beneficial, yet concededly risky, products emanating
from the chemical industry are PCBs, which have very good electrical resistance capacity,
making them useful components of electrical transformers, methyl isocyanate, which is useful
in making pesticides, and dioxin, a waste product of a beneficial herbicide manufacturing pro-
cess. The waste management sector is essential to society. To understand the importance of
waste management, one only needs to ask what would life be like for us if we had no place to
store or dispose of our solid or hazardous waste? Life would probably be chaotic and surely
would be unhealthy.
352. Under some facts, as a matter of sound public policy, taxpayers of a governmental
entity should ratably bear losses instead of requiring a small group of individuals to bear the
losses alone. See Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 726-27 (2d Cir. 1964) (in a
tort case taxpayers of Buffalo, New York, rather than innocent plaintiffs could bear ratable
losses more easily).
353. The recently experienced inadequacy and nonavailability of a taxing authority for
Superfund is a classic illustration of the desirability of a funding apparatus that ensures the
continued financial solvency of a victim compensation scheme.
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the common law tort system's causation model is ill-equipped to address the
intricate nuances underlying the causation issue in toxic tort litigation.
Although tinkering with causation by palliative devices such as alternative
causation, enterprise liability, and concert of action offers some relief to a
disadvantaged claimant, this tinkering falls far short of the mark in provid-
ing compensation to the victim, in deterring the polluter and others similarly
situated, and in advancing corrective justice and fairness between the parties.
Moreover, this deficiency is exacerbated by the apparent inability of judges
and juries to handle capably the esoteric scientific and medical questions that
abound regarding the issue of the causal relationship between a claimant's
injury and his or her exposure to a toxic substance or hazardous waste. In
view of these major hurdles, reconciling the causation element of traditional
common law torts with the toxic tort counterpart seems well-nigh impossible
and, more importantly, very impractical.
Since the traditional tort litigation model seems inappropriate for address-
ing causation, a proposed alternative solution suggested in this Article es-
chews the traditional model's deficiencies and presents itself in the form of
an administrative compensation scheme. The objective of this system is not
to dispense with a causation requirement; to the contrary, policy considera-
tions underlying the proposed scheme mandate that the requisite causal
nexus exist. 35 4 Existing legal notions of the dominant test for this causal
requirement, the more probable than not test, however, will not necessarily
control; in fact, greater deference will be given to scientific and medical theo-
ries regarding the requisite proof of causation as science and law meld to-
gether to resolve this intricate question. In addition, the administrative
scheme's use of an expert administrative board to decide the causation ques-
tion will obviate the likelihood of uninformed decision-making. The advan-
tages attendant to using this administrative procedure are: (1) it will
produce a multidimensional determination of liability, thereby accurately re-
flecting the nature of the problem involved, and (2) it will remove this deter-
mination from the whim and caprice of unsophisticated, uninformed judges
and lay jurors, thus enhancing the likelihood of a reasonably accurate deter-
mination. As a result, the proposed compensation scheme will promote a
more objective, fair, and precise causation determination. Coupled with the
other features of the scheme concerning damages and methods of funding,
the proposed administrative compensation scheme will further the principal
tort law goals of compensation, deterrence, and corrective justice. Most sig-
nificantly, however, the proposed administrative compensation scheme will
reconcile the causation element and toxic tort litigation, a truly notable feat.
354. The elimination of nonmeritorious toxic tort claims furthers the tort goals of fair com-
pensation, effective deterrence, and corrective justice. Even an administrative scheme, that
shuns lay jurors, needs prophylatic measures to guard vigilantly against nonmeritorious
claims. The preeminent protection against frivolous claims is a causation requirement. See
Huber, supra note 302, at 81. "[A] claimant for funds must be required to show causation, if
not beyond a reasonable doubt then at least with some serious degree of scientific credibility.
An administrative compensation system should be able to enforce this requirement at least as
effectively as a court." Id.
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